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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 The purpose of this thesis is to understand warlordism, and in particular, the 
warlord environment in Afghanistan.  Weak central authority in the state of Afghanistan 
has been a political tradition due largely to a patronage system of governance.  This weak 
political structure allows warlord military organizations to draw resources from the 
environment.  Warlord organizations use armed force to access these resources.  
Warlords also wield political power and use their military organizations as a base to 
expand their power and fame.  There are numerous population bases of support, and not 
all are good for the growth of stable organizations.  However, warlords are able to 
develop their political organizations reliably because of the stability provided by their 
military organizations.  Because of these factors, the warlord Ahmed Rashid Dostum, a 
man with minimal political education, has slowly but surely built a powerful political 
organization.
Abdul Rashid Dostum is an ethnic Uzbek Afghan warlord.  Involved in Afghan 
internal politics for over 20 years, his fame spread globally after 9/11 when he became 
one of the Northern Alliance leaders fighting with American Special Forces (SF) against 
the Taliban.  Dostum’s activities span the periods of Afghan monarchy, communist rule, 
Soviet occupation, civil war, Taliban rule, and the current Afghan government.  When the 
communist regime collapsed in 1992, Dostum, a former communist general, established 
himself as a warlord in the north.  His activities provide an abundance of data illustrating 
various aspects of warlordism, including the nature of his power bases and how his power 
base changed as the Afghan regime climate changed. 
 The relevance of the warlord problem is revealed in failed states such as 
Afghanistan.  In Afghanistan, the U.S. faces a political situation where historically there 
have been several back and forth cycles of weak central state rule and civil war.  Reporter 
Masood Farivar describes how the warlord problem has been overshadowed by the 
Taliban insurgency that seeks to overrun the state.1  Essentially, the warlord problem 
points to the enduring problem of the Afghan state: weak central control of the grass 
1  Masood Farivar, "Washington's Blind Spot in Afghanistan," Wall Street Journal Jun 21, 2004. 
xii
roots population in the periphery.  It has been seven years since the U.S. forces 
decapitated the Taliban regime, installing first an interim and then a democratically 
elected Afghan government. Although democratic institutions take years to develop, the 
plan for Afghanistan is running out of time. 
 Warlords are defined by their military legitimacy and their desire for political 
power, fame, and wealth.  Rashid Dostum's rise to his current position as one of the most 
powerful military leaders in Afghanistan resulted from his desire for power and fame and 
presents a challenge to the Afghan state as it struggles for peace and stability. 
 Patronage as a form of state governance is an inherently weak system.  Patronage 
politics in Afghanistan has shallow roots, revealed by  weak state policies.  As long as 
patronage (supported by monetary disbursement) flows to local leaders, nominal 
allegiance is paid to the central government and governance is left to traditional 
organizations and local strongmen.  Patronage ties are much stronger at local levels; there 
strongmen become warlords and seek to widen their political powers, undermining the 
central government.  Foreign patronage of warlords also compromises the state's ability 
to govern locally.
 Warlord economics revolves around a variety of potential revenues for financing 
warlord groups.   There are four types of resources: natural resources, taxes, illicit 
activities, and foreign aid.  Under the communist regime, Dostum ran a militia funded by 
the government, and resources for operations came from a stable and simple 
environment.  When the Afghan central authority disintegrated and the state plunged into 
civil war, the opportunities for revenue abounded, but the number of adversaries 
increased.  This new economic environment became very complex. 
 Warlord organizations flourish amidst an environment of weak central state 
authority.  In simple environments, the warlord exercises direct control over his 
subordinates.  In highly complex environments, a warlord patron network may extend 
horizontally to other warlords, state institutions, international actors, illegal-clandestine 
actors and other partners. 
 Dostum’s early organization, the 53rd Division, was a pure military organization, 
with dedicated revenues from the state and foreign donors.  Even in the 1980’s and early 
xiii
1990’s, Dostum funneled capital from the state both legally and illegally, as the customs 
fees he collected at Hairatan should have been forwarded to Kabul.  This was a complex 
situation.  But due to the weakness of the state, there was never really a risk that the state 
would stop his illegal activities.  Thus, the environment in the 1980s could be considered 
stable.  When the Najibullah regime fell, Dostum commanded a division-sized element, 
probably the largest organization operating at the tactical level.  He established standing 
operating procedures through fear and ruthless leadership to ensure consistent behavior 
from his subordinates.   
 In terms of popular support, because traditional society does not extend beyond 
the local level, cross ethnic political movements may be difficult to establish without the 
support of one base ethno-linguistic population.  To expand a political base of support 
across ethnic groups, the threat or use of force can accelerate to consolidation of various 
political groups.  A warlord like Dostum, who has slowly grown a strong military and 
ethnic power base, may prove to have better success in the long run surviving in the 
turbulent Afghan political environment. 
 Dostum can be a positive force by providing an alternative to the Pushtun and 
Jihadi political elements in the rest of the country.  It will be interesting to see which 
group is better capable of subduing or integrating tribal society into national level 
politics.  Dostum has shown that a disciplined, secular militia can form a strong base to 
mobilize ethnic populations.  However, since it is not clear that tribal law can work at the 
national level, what group can better subdue the unstable and violent tribal society?   
 Warlords will be brought into the national regime when the government gains 
control of the sovereign right to the use of force within the state boundaries.  This 
includes the government’s ability to regulate and tax the sources of warlord revenue.  
Taxation and representation are the means and building blocks for a functioning 
democratic state.  Implementing these means is integral to replacing the weak option of 
patronage style governance.  These means allow the state to build institutional bodies that 
can effectively govern the populace.  Until the central authority seizes their role of 
governing in the countryside, warlords like Dostum will hold tight to their place in 
Afghan society.
xiv
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1I. INTRODUCTION 
 The purpose of this thesis is to understand warlordism, and in particular, the 
warlord environment in Afghanistan.  Weak central authority in the state of Afghanistan 
has been a political tradition due largely to a patronage system of governance.  This weak 
political structure allows warlord military organizations to draw resources from the 
environment.  Warlord organizations use armed force to access these resources.  
Warlords also wield political power and use their military organizations as a base to 
expand their power and fame.  There are numerous population bases of support, and not 
all are good for the growth of stable organizations.  However, warlords are able to 
develop their political organizations reliably because of the stability provided by their 
military organizations.  Because of these factors, the warlord Ahmed Rashid Dostum, a 
man with minimal formal political education, has slowly but surely built a political 
organization based on ethnicity.
 The relevance of the warlord problem is revealed in failed states such as 
Afghanistan.  In Afghanistan, the U.S. faces a political situation where historically there 
have been several back and forth cycles of weak central state rule and civil war.  Reporter 
Masood Farivar describes how the warlord problem has been overshadowed by the 
Taliban insurgency that seeks to overrun the state.2  Essentially, the warlord problem 
points to the enduring problem of the Afghan state: weak central control of the grass 
roots population in the peripheries.  It has been seven years since the U.S. forces 
decapitated the Taliban regime, installing first an interim and then a democratically 
elected Afghan government. Although democratic institutions take years to develop, the 
plan for Afghanistan is running out of time. 
 Many have warned that since the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United 
States, Afghanistan's weak government has allowed warlord organizations to proliferate.  
2  Masood Farivar, "Washington's Blind Spot in Afghanistan," Wall Street Journal June 21, 2004. 
While crushing the Taliban insurgency is critical, the U.S. must abandon its single-minded focus on 
military operations against radicals. The Taliban still enjoy some support in the south largely because the 
region's residents have not benefited from their fall. Reconstruction is not happening, and the security 
situation has not improved there or elsewhere in the country. It's just as important to give Afghans hope for 
the future by focusing resources on such efforts. 
2Soon these warlords may become too powerful for the U.S.-backed Afghan regime to 
deal with politically, economically, and militarily. 
With $2.6 billion plus in poppies and another couple of billion that come 
through in the regular smuggling world ... at what point do [the warlords] 
not need us anymore? At what point, with all of this money coming in, do 
they look at us ... and say, 'Thank you very much, we are quite happy with 
the way it is. I have my big house, my militia, so don't [mess] with me.'3
 The country is in a vicious cycle: the longer Kabul goes without reining in the 
warlords, the more difficult that crucial task will become. The longer the warlords rule in 
the countryside, the less faith the people of Afghanistan will ever have in the central 
government. 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION  
 The primary research question of this thesis will be: What is the nature of a 
warlord’s rise to power?  
B.  METHODOLOGY  
 To elaborate on the primary research question, this thesis uses theory and 
historical evidence to explore each of six specific research questions.  Each succeeding 
research question adds additional understanding.  The final question provides a 
conclusion to help explain how and why warlords operate as they do 
1. What is a "warlord"?  
2. How do patronage systems affect governance? 
3. What are warlords' sources of wealth? 
4. How does organizational theory illuminate the nature of warlords and their 
organizations? 
5. What is significant about the population base for political mobilization? 
6. What is the nature of warlords' political organization in places such as 
Afghanistan? 
3  Kathy Gannon, "Afghanistan Unbound;" Foreign Affairs 83, no. 3 (May/June 2004), 35.  Bearden 
warns that the warlords and factional leaders may not be willing to cooperate with the United States for 
much longer, since they will soon have enough resources to strike out on their own.  
3 Each question is answered with reference to an academic theory that sheds light 
on a different aspect of warlordism.  Historical and contemporary case study material is 
used as supporting data to illustrate the theoretical points.  The career of the Afghan 
warlord Abdul Rashid Dostum will be drawn upon to provide this data. 
C. ABDUL RASHID DOSTUM:  CASE STUDY 
Abdul Rashid Dostum is an ethnic Uzbek Afghan warlord.  Involved in Afghan 
internal politics for over 20 years, his fame spread globally after 9/11 when he became 
one of the Northern Alliance leaders fighting with American Special Forces (SF) against 
the Taliban.  Dostum’s activities span the periods of Afghan monarchy, communist rule, 
Soviet occupation, civil war, Taliban rule, and the current Afghan government.  When the 
communist regime collapsed in 1992, Dostum, a former communist general, established 
himself as a warlord in the north.  His activities provide an abundance of data illustrating 
various aspects of warlordism, including the nature of his power bases, and how his 
power base changed as the Afghan regime climate changed. 
D. ORGANIZATION 
 This thesis contains seven chapters, including this introduction.  Chapter II begins 
with a general description of patronage systems, and presents historical aspects of 
patronage in Afghanistan, including discussion of centralized patronage, weak state 
policies, foreign sponsorship and state weakness, the decline of Pushtun dominance, 
warlord patronage and the role of foreign states in the patronage system. The chapter 
ends with an analysis of examples of patronage interactions in which Dostum has been 
involved.
 Chapter III describes the sources of Afghanistan's revenue and the revenue 
available to warlords.  After a brief introduction of the four classifications of revenue, a 
short theoretical piece on stability and complexity provides a method to assess the 
warlord economic environment.4   The discussion then returns to a more detailed 
4 The author's understanding of organization theory is derived from classes with Eric Janzen at the 
U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in 2006, including Organizational Design for Special Operations.  The 
application of organization theory to violent non-state actors is discussed in Troy S. Thomas, Stephen D. 
Kiser and William D. Casebeer, Warlords Rising : Confronting Violent Non-State Actors (Lanham, MD: 
Lexington Books, 2005), 254. 
4discussion of the four sources of warlord revenues: natural resources, taxes, illicit 
revenues, and government funds and foreign aid.  This is followed by an analysis to show 
that globalization, though not a direct cause of warlordism, has impacted warlord 
revenues by increasing the demand for many of the above-mentioned resources.  The 
chapter closes with an assessment of the Afghan environment’s complexity and 
uncertainty.
 Chapter IV analyzes the effect of traditional social structures on the stability of 
armed and political groups.  This chapter is concerned with the interrelated facets of 
armed groups, ethnicity, tribe, qawm, and political mobilization.  The term qawm refers 
to a local grouping of persons based on location often related to family or profession.  
The discussion begins with an overview of Afghan ethnic groups and a look at how the 
traditional social structure of the tribes affects armed groups.   Next, the role of khans and 
qawms is analyzed, followed by a discussion of village level politics.  After a brief 
discussion of qawm based militias, the chapter goes on to describe Ahmed Rashid 
Dostum’s militia, which is not qawm based but merit based.  A theoretical discussion of 
warlords and their warriors draws on material developed by noted experts on warlords.  
This is followed by an analysis of Dostum’s leadership and adversarial relationships.
 Chapter V traces how warlords build political legitimacy from their military base.  
It begins with an overview of the political changes in modern Afghanistan.  It next 
provides a background on the origins of Dostum’s Junbesh party, followed by discussion 
of the Turkic population base that has become the political base for the organization.  
This is followed by a description of the gradual change in Dostum’s activities from 
military to politics.  The chapter concludes with a discussion of Dostum’s political 
campaigning, political demands and compromises, and his difficult public relations. 
 Chapter VI, the conclusion, summarizes the main points of the thesis. 
E. WHAT IS A WARLORD? 
 In this section, a working definition of the concept of a warlord is presented, 
followed by brief biographical information on Dostum, whose history as an Afghan 
warlord serves as the main case study in this thesis.  
5 Drawing on extensive field research, Antonio Giustozzi offers a definition of a 
warlord focused on distinguishing warlords from other non-state actors. The warlord, he 
says, “is recognized as a legitimate and maybe even charismatic military leader, because 
of his ability to provide important services to subordinate commanders, such as 
leadership, coordination, logistics and possibly others including foreign relations.” 5
Thus, an important aspect of the warlord definition is military legitimacy.6
 To define a warlord as one who practices military action provides a basis on 
which to build a more comprehensive explanation of the phenomenon.  But as Giustozzi 
notes, the use of force is a dangerous proposition even for a warlord. “At any given time 
during the course of the war some of [the] actors might have an interest in perpetuating 
the conflict.  However, once fortunes are accumulated, war and the uncertainty of 
outcome which characterize it become a problem.”7  On the other hand, Giustozzi notes 
that successful Chinese warlords of the early 20th century showed benevolent behavior.8
 A well-developed academic approach to the concept of warlords is based on an 
economic point of view.  Many scholars have studied the economics of warlordism.9
Through this lens, the warlord is ruthless in seeking selfish aggrandizement of wealth and 
resources.10  As practitioners of the use of force, warlords are what Mackinlay and 
Keegan classify as "true warriors" rather than "true soldiers."11  An overwhelming 
economic motive drives the use of force, and the use of force itself is not uniformly a 
military manifestation.  Sasha Lezhnev provides a particularly insightful discussion of the 
5 A. Giustozzi, The Debate on Warlordism: The Importance OF Military Legitimacy (London: Crisis 
States Program, [2005]), 14. 
6  Ibid., 9.  
7  Ibid., 6. 
8  Ibid., 7. 
9  John Mackinlay, Defining Warlords, Monograph 43, (London: Center for Defence Studies, 2000), 1. 
“Warlordism implies a diversity of activities and cultural structures, and a definitive picture must also 
involve other actors, including anthropologists and military experts in addition to the humanitarians who 
are at the epicenter of the ‘economy of civil war’ approach. 
10  Ibid. 9 “Firstly, the warlord was not a mindless barbarian returning an ungoverned population back 
to a tribal phase in their evolution….He was a product of his time and of his environment, intensely 
modern, not regressive or backward looking. Secondly, the warlord was above all exploiting the same 
global marketplace and universal culture that increasingly dominated organized society in the world at 
large.”
11  Mackinlay, 9 “The proposition that warlords were not (using Keegan’s definition) true warriors 
who would stand and fight in a disciplined, Clausewitzian manner, but real warriors who followed a 
Cossack fighting tradition and saw war as an opportunity for profit and as a way of life, was not new.” 
6warrior education and worldview, noting that in regards to their background and 
motivation, warlords are “people who are driven overwhelmingly by personal power, 
glory, and monetary gain and who are ready to sacrifice thousands of lives, land, and 
property for that power.”12  Lezhnev claims that the central motivation of the warlord, in 
addition to monetary resources, is the quest for “wealth, power, and fame.”13
This thesis accepts the idea that warlords share two main characteristics: they 
have military legitimacy, and they are motivated by political power, wealth, and fame.  
F. DOSTUM’S BACKGROUND 
 Giustozzi notes that Dostum might have been considered a warlord as early as 
1992 when, during the post-communist regime, he controlled what was the only mobile 
fighting force of the former Afghan state, the 53rd Division.14  Dostum used the militia to 
gain control of one-tenth of Afghanistan by 1994.  His military legitimacy, recognized 
even during the communist regime, is unquestionable.  Equally important is his evident 
desire for wealth, power, and fame.  During the 1992-1996 Afghan civil war, Dostum co-
founded and headed the Junbesh-I Milli-yi Islami, the National Islamic Movement, and 
over time built a following that increased both his political base as well as his military 
power.
 Dostum used his military skills to rise above his humble origins. He was born into 
a poor Uzbek farming family and worked in the natural gas fields near Sheberghan.  He 
eventually joined the military, becoming a Communist party member during the Khalq 
and Najibullah regimes.  With only a few years of primary school, he has been mocked 
for his lack of education.15   His reputation as a classic rough and tough strongman, the 
“Mike Tyson of Afghan politics,” 16  reinforces his political fame as a warlord .
12  Sasha Lezhnev, Crafting Peace: Strategies to Deal with Warlords in Collapsing States (Lanham, 
Maryland: Lexington Books, 2005), 2-4. 
13  Ibid., 5. 
14  Antonio Giustozzi, The Ethnicisation of an Afghan Faction: Junbesh-I I-Milli from its Origins to 
the Presidential Elections (London: Crisis States Research Center,[2005]), 2. 
15 Antonio Giustozzi, Respectable Warlords? The Politics of State building in Post-Taleban 
Afghanistan (London: Crisis States Program,[2003]), 7. 
16  Anthony Davis, "Makeover for a Warlord," Time 159, no. 22 (June 3, 2002), 46. 
7 Dostum began by setting up and managing security forces, the Jauzjani, to protect 
the gas fields in northern Afghanistan for the state-owned natural gas company.  By the 
mid-1980’s, he commanded a battalion of Jauzjani militia.  Eventually, the government 
expanded the role of the Jauzjani forces.  In 1988, Dostum’s force was redesignated the 
53rd Division, a mobile division with an internal security mission reporting directly to 
communist leader Najibullah.  Dostum became Najibullah’s security chief. As the Soviet 
war machine retreated home, mujahideen warriors began a rebellion against Najibullah.  
Dostum’s Soviet-financed division of hardy Uzbek and Turkmen warriors became 
Najibullah’s de facto national mobile strike force.17  Dostum first gained fame that year 
after he dispatched the force to Kandahar to thwart a coup by Durrani mujahideen and 
army officers.   
 Dostum came to preeminence after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 
1989.  Under the communist regime, General Dostum consolidated his militia force in 
northern Afghanistan, centered on Mazar-I Sharif.18  As the communist regime 
weakened, it sought to reassert control in the north by placing ethnic Pushtun General 
Rasul in power in Hairatan garrison.  Dostum successfully raised support for the garrison 
commander, General Mumin, and rallied opposition to the regime’s replacement.  In 
March, 1992, Dostum defeated Rasul’s 18th Division in Balkh and seized control of 
Mazar-I Sharif.  The transition in Mazar met little resistance and the north remained 
stable under Dostum’s military rule.    
 With the imminent fall of Kabul to jihadi forces, Dostum turned against 
Najibullah and reached an agreement with Ahmed Shah Massood, the Tajik Islamist 
military leader, to enter Kabul in order to expel the Pushtun jihadi leadership.  This began 
a period of broken alliances, failed peace agreements and the civil war of warlords versus 
Jihadis that devastated Kabul and the countryside for five years.  During this time, 
Dostum alternately supported the primary groups in the area: the jihadi Pushtuns under 
Hekmatyar and the Tajiks under Massood. 
17  Antonio Giustozzi, Respectable Warlords? The Politics of State building in Post-Taleban 
Afghanistan (London: Crisis States Program,[2003]), 7. 
18  Barnett R. Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the 
International System (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995), 159. 
8 After the fall of Kabul’s centralized authority in 1992, Dostum's force was the law 
of the land and in his militia he had his power base.   During the 1990’s, he went back 
and forth in alliances with almost every Afghan civil war faction on the battlefield, 
including the ideologically motivated Taliban.  During this period, Dostum co-established 
Junbesh-I Milli-yi Islami with other Uzbek and Ismailia commanders, and by 1993, he 
had consolidated control in the north and began to establish a political stance, all the 
while exhibiting warlord characteristics.  Dostum's political rise was aided by carefully 
chosen advisors, including former Communist party members.  Under pressure from his 
Uzbekistani patrons, he spoke in favor of a unified state of Afghanistan.  However, in 
reality, he maintained virtual sovereign control over the north.19
 The Taliban era brought Islamic fundamentalist rule to Kabul in 1996 and their 
control extended to the rest of Afghanistan's Northern provinces a year later.  Dostum 
was driven into exile twice, in 1997 and again in 1998. He returned to Afghanistan in the 
spring of 2001 to fight along side Atta Mohammed in the Northern Alliance, against the 
Taliban in the hills south of Mazar-I Sharif.  
 Dostum's alliance with Atta has since disintegrated and they are now bitter rivals, 
with Atta controlling Mazar-I Sharif and Dostum controlling the areas to the north and 
west.  Though he claims a deputy position in the state defense department, Dostum's 
failure to control Mazar, the capital of the north and key to the area's agricultural, oil and 
gas wealth, has weakened his political and economic strength.20
 To summarize: Warlords have both military legitimacy and the desire for political 
power, fame, and wealth. Dostum meets this definition as one of the most powerful 
military leaders in Afghanistan; his own personal desire for power and fame presents a 
challenge to peace and stability in the struggling Afghan state.   
19  Rubin, 275. 
20  Davis, Makeover for a Warlord, 46. 
9II. THE PATRONAGE SYSTEM 
 Afghanistan has a tradition of the central government in Kabul acting as a patron 
to the countryside. At the same time, regional strongmen have their own regional 
patronage systems.  These systems weaken national level government, especially in a 
state heavily dependent on foreign support.  When weak states collapse, the regional 
strongmen fight each other for opportunities to obtain revenue that will strengthen and 
expand their own regional patronage networks.
 This chapter describes the concept of patronage systems and the history of 
patronage systems in Afghanistan.  As the chapter demonstrates, patronage yields an 
inherently weak system.  Patronage ties are much stronger at local levels where leaders 
are closer to the populace.  It is at the grassroots level that local strongmen become 
warlords and widen their political scope, thus weakening the central government from 
below.  Foreign patronage of warlords further damages the ability of the state to govern at 
the local level.   
A. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF PATRONAGE SYSTEMS 
 Patronage establishes allegiances among a group of people.   The patron provides 
for the client, and the client gives allegiance to the patron.  Warlord patronage networks 
consist of personal ties with the purpose of generating and allocating resources based on 
the priorities of the warlord.  The simplest form of patronage is a single warlord and his 
band of warriors.  The warlord is the patron; the warriors are his followers.  This simple 
patronage system provides the manpower that runs a warlord organization.  As the 
warlord's goals expand, his patronage may extend to other actors, such as political or 
commercial interests.  The warlord himself may come under the patronage of another 
actor, such as a foreign state.
 Warlord organizations blend warrior loyalties with political or business 
partnerships.  A patron-client tie binds leaders to clients on the basis of personal trust.  
Cultural incentive structures often reinforce these patronage ties. Michael Mousseau uses 
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the concept of clientalism to describe business deals in non-Western societies.21  Local 
ties create obligations based on various social “in-groups.”  Contractual legal agreements 
and Western-style notions of legitimacy have little utility.  Power is distributed from the 
patron to clients in the “in-group.” 
 When a member of the in-group does not fulfill his part of a bargain, there is no 
lawful way to regulate his actions, so other members of the in-group personally regulate 
that member’s behavior by making claims on his honor.  The prospect of expelling a 
violator from the in-group is challenging due to strong family or religious bonds.  This 
tradition conflicts with Western market capitalism, which espouses efficiency based on 
free market competition, legally binding contracts, and the laws of supply and demand.  
In the traditional setting, when the use of force is determined the appropriate means for 
policing within the network, the person who guarantees results and security is the 
warlord. Mousseau points out that “those with the most to lose … are patrons and their 
lieutenants who hold privileged positions in the old clientalism hierarchies.”22
 Applying these concepts to the situation in Afghanistan, it is clear that with 
Afghanistan's regime changes, new leaders fought to overcome the old elite. Upon 
assuming power, they reestablished the system of governing through the tribal patronage 
ties which continued to undermine an already poorly functioning bureaucracy.  (More on 
tribal politics will be discussed in Chapter V.)  Today, Afghan President Hamid Karzai is 
caught in a vicious cycle.  He is trying to improve the efficiency and reach of the 
government; however, to remain in power, he must welcome incompetent warlords into 
the government, creating corruption and inefficiency.23
B. CENTRALIZED PATRONAGE IN AFGHANISTAN 
 At the national level, the Durrani Pushtuns developed the patronage system in 
Afghanistan.  Their dominance originated in the mid-eighteenth century, when Pushtun 
21  Michael Mousseau, ""Market Civilization and its Clash with Terror"," International Security 27, 
no. 3 (2003), 10. 
22 Michael Mousseau, ""Market Civilization and its Clash with Terror"," International Security 27, no. 
3 (2003), 10. 
23 Giustozzi, “Good States vs. Bad warlords,” 8. The Afghan government's problems are exacerbated 
by the fact that many current warlords and administrators dislike and do not trust the intelligentsia.  
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Ahmed Shah Durrani, based in Kandahar, established a system of patronage where 
Pushtuns of his tribe dominated other ethnic groups and Pushtuns of other tribes.  By the 
end of the nineteenth century, Amir Abdu-Rahman, in a series of agreements with Russia 
and Britain, consolidated central Pushtun authority over the present-day borders of 
Afghanistan.  Additionally, he established pockets of Pushtun settlement in northern 
Afghanistan, areas traditionally populated by other ethnic groups.24  Pushtun involvement 
continues today.  The previous Taliban regime and the current administration of Hamid 
Karzai show that the Pushtuns continue to be a force in national politics. 
 Of course, the tradition of patronage only works if the patron has funds and 
services to distribute to his clients.  At the local level, khans and landlords associate with 
qawms or other tribal institutions to organize and coordinate local peoples.  The term 
qawm, the Arabic term for tribe, is a term used in this thesis to describe a social grouping 
at the grass roots level of society based on kinship, proximity, or profession.  Qawms and 
other local social systems affecting warlordism will be discussed more in Chapter V.  
When traditional leaders use this method at the national level, they control the 
countryside only when they have money to give out, which makes this a tenuous system.  
As a consequence, the patronage system fails to institutionalize long-term connections 
between the population and the state.  Once the local qawms and religious leaders 
received patronage in exchange for their allegiance to the central authority, they accept 
the absence of state institutional structures that would properly represent the people in the 
national government.  When central authority funds are lean, the state has no formal 
institutions with which to regulate and represent society when tribal leaders become 
dissatisfied with their patronage. 
 As Rubin notes, after the Anglo-Afghan wars in the 1800’s, the Afghan central 
government received funds as a result of a constant level of foreign domination.25  The 
British suzerainty funded the Afghan patronage system under the Durrani monarchs until 
1919, when Afghanistan gained independence in the Third Anglo-Afghan war.  Without 
foreign aid to support his patronage system, the monarch, Abdul Rahman Khan, was 
plagued by tribal and religious revolts.  State services plummeted.  From 1955 to 1978, 
24  Peter Marsden, Afghanistan: Minorities, Conflict and the Search for Peace (London: Minority 
Rights Group International,[2001]), 1-2. 
25 Rubin 19-20. 
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Afghanistan received $2.5 billion in aid from the Soviets and $533 million in aid from the 
U.S.26  By the Soviet intervention in 1979, the central authorities had firmly established a 
reliable funding source, allowing them to reestablish services and a stronger patronage 
relationship with the population.  This period also produced a need for an educated 
Afghan state civil service and military institution.  Well paid military men in the service 
of the national government helped to insulate the monarchy from the populace.27   
 History makes it clear that the system of centralized patronage in Afghanistan has 
inhibited the development of strong vertical institutions, and has thereby kept the state 
from extending its governance to the countryside.   
C. WEAK STATE POLICIES 
 Laws, state institutions, and force all are potential inhibitors to the warlord.  The 
Afghanistan state was established by the British during the colonial era.  Strategically, 
Afghanistan met the needs of the imperial power as a buffer to block Russian 
encroachment on British colonial India.  As Rubin notes, to achieve this task the state of 
Afghanistan was constructed with a preponderance of coercive institutions.28  Other 
institutions to properly service and represent the population were not developed.  As Joel 
Migdal points out, “social structure, particularly the existence of numerous other social 
organizations that exercise effective social control, has a decisive effect on the likelihood 
of the state greatly expanding its capabilities.”29
 Additionally, educational institutions were not developed to the degree required to 
service the interests of the local population.  Most of the state elites in Afghanistan were 
trained in Europe, America, and the Soviet Union, and the religious elites were mostly 
trained in Cairo, Najaf, or Qom.  Rubin concludes that predominance of foreign-trained 
elites undermined Afghanistan's ability to integrate nationally because they were trained 
26  Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International 
System, 20. 
27  Rubin 20. 
28  Rubin 8. 
29  Joel Midgal  S., State in Society: Studying how States and Societies Transform and Constitute One 
another (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 64. 
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outside of the home state.30  Dependency on foreign education for elites also alleviated 
the state from developing a large base of quality state institutions within the Afghanistan. 
 Understanding that weak states have a lack of social control and state capability, 
two key factors relate to the rise of warlordism.  First, warlords are better able to compete 
with a weak state to exercise control through the use of force.  Where the revenues can be 
best controlled often determines whether the state is weak relative to the warlord.  
Second, since warlords use force to control society, they often command the only social 
organization to interact with the state.  In such an environment, the state and the warlords 
may attempt to accommodate each other, avoid each other, or end up in conflict.
D. WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN SPONSOR AND STATE WEAKNESS 
 "For much of the modern era, Afghanistan might credibly be defined as a large 
body of rocky land surrounded by neighbors who export their own conflicts onto its 
territory."31  As Barnett Rubin and Andrea Armstrong observe, Afghanistan has been the 
scene for proxy conflict since the British established it as a buffer between India and 
Russia.
 Political scientist Paul Jackson points out that throughout Africa the colonial 
powers destroyed the traditional political entities that had existed before empire, 
substituting their own colonial trade networks.32  His theories apply to Afghanistan, 
where colonial politics in India were concerned with acquisition of scarce resources for 
the homeland.  Since resource extraction was the goal of colonial governments, 
governance at the local levels was more like a liaison effort, with no real change to the 
traditional methods of social control.  As a result, no credible intermediate-level state 
secular institutions developed.  When the colonial powers withdrew, the traditional 
indigenous power networks, rather than the state, were left with the responsibility for the 
administration of the scarce resources.  This created a significant institutional void that in 
30  Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan : State Formation and Collapse in the International 
System, 9. 
31  Barnett R. Rubin and Andrea Armstrong, "Regional Issues in the Reconstruction of Afghanistan," 
World Policy Journal 20, no. 1 (Spring 2003), 31. 
32  Paul Jackson, "Warlords and States in Africa," draft manuscript, 17-18 (accessed October 1, 2006). 
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many states has never been corrected, and helps to explain why weak states stay weak 
despite regime changes at the top.   
 The environment during the Cold War created similar relationships between the 
superpowers and their third world clients.  The state could fund its institutions or projects, 
so by default, other actors took over many of the state's functions, especially outside of 
the capital city, where the state normally focuses its resources.  As William Reno 
suggests, states establish patronage with anyone who can provide money or services on 
its behalf.33  However, in the long run, this stunts the growth of state institutions and 
empowers the warlords or other organizations that enter into deals with the state.
In the specific case of Afghanistan, the withdrawal of Cold War sponsors from the 
area resulted in a series of very shallow regimes with non-existent political 
infrastructure.34  When Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev announced the end of the 
Soviet Union on December 25, 1991, the announcement was immediately followed by a 
U.S.-USSR agreement to stop all weapons deliveries and support to the Afghan factions, 
including the central communist regime.  Kabul was quickly isolated from the 
countryside and the regional strongmen thus became warlords.  Within three months, the 
communist regime under President Najibullah had collapsed and Najibullah himself was 
put under house arrest before he could escape the country.35
E. DECLINE OF PUSHTUN AFGHAN DOMINANCE 
 As the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, some former pro-communist Khalq 
members of the armed forces secretly allied with mujahideen leader Gulbuddin 
Hekmatyar and planned a coup.  Although they failed, the coup unveiled divisions within 
the Pushtun ethnic movement.  Najibullah was a Pushtun, as were the Khalq members 
and Hekmatyar.  The failed coup highlights the vulnerabilities of tribal and ethnic 
33  William Reno, Warlord Politics and African States (Boulder: Lynner Rienner Publishers, 1998), 
257. 
34  Mackinlay, Defining Warlords, 6-7. “It was in the spaces created by this withdrawal of power — in 
the no-go areas — that the new warlords appeared.” 
35  Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan : State Formation and Collapse in the International 
System, 1.  Najibullah was put under house arrest before he could escape the country.  He was killed later. 
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movements.36  Looking at the history of the Pushtun tradition, it is clear why, as a tribal 
movement, the Pushtuns never established control over the countryside and particularly 
over the other minority groups.  Tribal organizations rely on a system of honor and 
obligation to regulate a particular tribe.  They do not necessarily seek to regulate others, 
and have no right to do so unless they actually share a sense of tribal rules through 
upbringing or blood.  The closer the blood relations are, the tighter the loyalties.  
Attempts to extend the family lines of responsibility and authority to a whole ethnic 
group are unveiled to be artificial and in this example turned out to be unstable.  (This 
theme of unstable ethnic politics will be examined in more detail in Chapter V.) 
 The pro-communist Khalq party members took control of the central authority 
after the monarchy and during the Soviet occupation.  Though the Khalqs were 
predominantly Pushtun, in line with the previous monarchy, they were of a different 
lineage, descendents of the Ghilzis and eastern Pushtuns.  Leaving aside political 
ideology, within the Afghan tribal movement the communist coup in April 1978 was seen 
as the usurping of Ghilzi power over the Durranis.  At the same time, the majority of the 
seven mujahideen leaders were also Ghilzi aligned.37  Additionally, the Pushtuns never 
accommodated other minority groups into their tribal codes.  According to tribal 
tradition, this would have been unexpected.  This again undermines the effectiveness of 
governance, since in a patronage system not having tribal control over a population is 
essentially not having any social control at all.  As noted by Anwar-ul-Haq Ahady,
What distinguishes the Pushtuns from other Muslim Afghans is their pre-
Islamic code of behavior – the Pushtunwali.  Although the Pushtunwali 
still constitutes a large part of Pushtun culture, the government has never 
encouraged its enforcement in non-Pushtun communities.  Indeed, since 
1880’s, the government has supported the Islamic Sharia against the 
Pushtunwali even in Pushtun areas.38
36  Anwar-ul-Haq Ahady, "The Decline of the Pushtuns in Afghanistan," Asian Survey 35, no. 7 (July 
1995), 635. 
37  Olivier Roy, the Lessons of the Soviet/Afghan War (London: Brassey's,[1991]).  Roy notes that 
"Hekmatyar, Sayaff, Nabi (Ghilzi) and Khales (eastern).  Gaylani and Mujaddidi have family links with the 
Ghilzis; only Rabbani is a non-Pushtun.  Both the Kabul regime and the Peshawar-based alliance are 
mainly Ghilzi.” 
38  Ahady, The Decline of the Pushtuns in Afghanistan, 632. 
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The only group of the former regime that managed to maintain a functional role 
was the military.  As is often the case with collapsed governments, military and militia 
leaders had the allegiance of their soldiers and were able to maintain some unit cohesion.   
Many institutional military commanders took their units and found a faction based on 
proximity to other military leaders.  It is telling that many officers looked to other 
military leaders for alliances in the context of the state power vacuum—as military men, 
they understood the value of military legitimacy.  A combination of proximity and 
military legitimacy led many military units to seek out and join the patronage of the 
regional military strongmen, who in the chaotic absence of central control become 
warlords.  After the fall of Najibullah, Ahady observes,  
Although some military units in Kabul defected to the Pushtun-dominated 
Hizbi Islami, and those units that were stationed in Pushtun areas 
transferred their weapons to Pushtun commanders, a great many more 
weapons came under Massud’s and Dostum’s control.  Thus, the chaotic 
downfall of the communist regime enabled the ethnic minorities to gain 
military superiority over the Pushtuns.39
 With the virtual collapse of the central government in Kabul, strongmen and 
warlords began to control territory and population.  Fighting among the various Jihadi 
and warlord factions across the country began, and Afghanistan slipped into civil war.  
The military forces themselves fractured into regional networks.  Dostum, the former 
communist general, consolidated a coherent command in the north, and emerged as the 
key figure among former military commanders.         
F. WARLORD PATRONAGE 
 Warlord patronage systems are based on the flow of funding. They run counter to 
state authority, diverting funds from government to social institutions, weakening the 
state-society bond while strengthening the warlords' network.  Warlord systems flourish 
and grow when resources and income are available and the warlord organization can find 
a means to seize and process them. This occurs when the state collapses and nothing 
restrains the growth of warlord organizations. 
39  Ahady, 626. 
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 In the most extreme growth situation, the warlord network may expand and 
become rich enough to build its own independent armed forces and to administer 
territory.  A warlord has no reason to forward funds to the state and the state is unable to 
audit or seize the funds.  The result is the privatization of all functions aimed at extracting 
revenue and profits, to the complete detriment of existing state institutions. The ultimate 
warlord domination of an area leaves the region isolated from central authority and, when 
warlords circumvent the state, they also have an opportunity to seek patronage from 
foreign powers.
 "Contrary to myth," writes Ahady, "warlordism is not a phenomenon ingrained in 
Afghan bone marrow by centuries of ethnic hatred and warfare. It is chiefly a legacy of 
the recent Soviet war."40  Between 1991 and 1994, the warlords actively recruited 
isolated military and mujahideen leaders and militias, bringing these groups under their 
control.  Within three years, the warlords began to establish military legitimacy.  The 
period that followed involved turbulent times for the central government.  With the 
exception of the four years of strict Taliban rule, the warlords grew their fiefdoms, often 
with the help of outside patrons to fund their activities.  The next section discusses the 
warlord general Dostum and the foreign state sponsors who have helped support him. 
G. PATRONAGE: FOREIGN STATES AND AFGHAN WARLORDS 
 As the U.S. leads the efforts in Afghan reconstruction operations,41 it discovers 
many reasons why it has been so hard to lead its coalition partners. American sponsorship 
of warlords early in the war gradually became full U.S. support for the Afghan 
government.  Neighboring states are wary of U.S. efforts to sustain a presence in 
Afghanistan.  As a result, the states of the region see maintaining ties with their chosen 
Afghan warlords, historically the means of proxy competition among the states in the 
region, as in their best interest. 42
Turkey and Uzbekistan are regional neighbors with long-standing interests in 
Afghanistan. Dealing with a local client such as Dostum is critical for maintaining their 
40  Farivar, Washington's Blind Spot in Afghanistan, 17. 
41 Though NATO assumed command and control in 2006, the effort and funding have been 
predominantly U.S. since 2001. 
42  Rubin and Armstrong, Regional Issues in the Reconstruction of Afghanistan, 36. 
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interests there.  Dostum has long had close ties with Turkey, which gave him asylum 
when the Taliban took over.  He also has important ties to Uzbekistan, which provided 
arms and men when he returned to Afghanistan to join the Northern Alliance in 2001.  
However, as Rubin notes, Dostum is not necessarily using his diplomatic ties with 
Turkey to gain support for the Karzai government.  In fact, he is seeking aid from 
Uzbekistan and Turkey to strengthen his own control in his traditional northern 
stronghold, and the change in government has not improved the security environment but 
rather has allowed Dostum to improve his own position.43
After the events of 9/11, the United States went to war against Al Qaeda and 
sponsored many warlords in Afghanistan.  Since the Taliban would not turn over Al 
Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden, the President deemed it necessary to topple the Taliban 
regime.  The U.S. invested the might of the American armed forces to aid warlords such 
as Dostum in unseating the Taliban regime.  Though his relations with U.S. Special 
Operations Forces (SOF) by all accounts were cordial, it was clear during this time that 
the sponsorship of Dostum also served his desires to regain control of the northern 
provinces of Afghanistan. 44   However, in only a few short years, this relationship has 
changed, even at the tactical level, where Dostum sees no apparent need to cooperate 
with the U.S. forces who now occupy what he considers his turf.45
 Indeed, the present Karzai regime faces the same problems as previous regimes in 
Afghanistan. The United States is acting implicitly as a patron of the Afghan state, which 
in turn is permitting the integration of warlords into the legitimate government. The issue 
is this:  Are the warlords once again entering into a shallow patronage relationship, or 
will they transform into true politicians?  At the diplomatic level, U.S. Ambassador 
Zalmay Khalilzad was content to work through the warlord representatives.  In an 
interview with Kathy Gannon, Khalilzad stated, "Some of [the warlords] have had awful 
43  Rubin and Armstrong, 31. 
44  Sepp, Kalev, I. “Meeting the 'G-Chief': ODA 595,” Special Warfare 15, no. 3 (September 2002): 
10.  For a detailed account of the events occurring between Dostum and U.S. forces, this journal article 
provides insight to Dostum’s desire to maintain and protect the enormous air power capabilities that the 
U.S. SOF team brought to the battlefield. 
45  Ben Fenwick, "Meanwhile in Afghanistan," Reason 36, no. 6 (November 2004), 48.  For a vivid 
account of a confrontation with an American Afghan National Army Advisor and Dostum.   Tensions 
heighten between the two, but in the end of the encounter, Dostum and the advisor’s actions  reflect the 
adversarial vs. cooperative relationship between the U.S. and warlords. 
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records. I don't deny that. The question [is] whether one should go toe-to-toe here and 
now or start an evolutionary strategy." 46  Additionally, former Ambassador Khalilzad 
has suggested that the local militias, those same groups that the UN is currently trying to 
disarm and reintegrate into Afghan society, should have provided security for the 2004 
election.  Khalilzad claimed that the militia members could be vetted and paired with 
U.S. Special Forces.  However, as of 2004, the militias had worked with Special Forces 
for two years and had shown no signs of improving their behavior. They focused much of 
their efforts on drugs, extortion, and intimidation, using their relationships with American 
soldiers to frighten local civilians and advance their own greedy agendas.47
 The initial appointment of Dostum to the position of deputy defense minister in 
2002 signified great promise as the warlords, now government employees, seemed vested 
in building the new national government for a united Afghanistan.48  However, in 2004 
Karzai’s control over the northern provinces still remained tenuous.  Far from Karzai’s 
offices in Kabul, Dostum reestablished control and his own form of law and order in the 
north.  Though Dostum had accepted patronage from Karzai in the form of a political 
appointment, he refused to cede power from his base in the north.  An incident in which 
Dostum expelled a Karzai appointed governor in Faryab province was an explicit and 
highly publicized example of his rejection of central authority.49  Though Karzai had 
some success in other regions marginalizing warlords,50 the familiar pattern of weak state 
policies and patronage had reappeared.  The failure of the state to establish a political 
infrastructure to connect with the population was a problem exacerbated by warlords like 
Dostum.  
46  Gannon, Afghanistan Unbound, 35. 
47  Gannon, Afghanistan Unbound, 35. 
48  Farhan Bokhari in Karachi, "Dostum's Appointment Broadens Afghan Government," FT Com
(December 26, 2001). 
49 Ben Fenwick, "Meanwhile in Afghanistan," Reason 36, no. 6 (November 2004), 48.  Fenwick 
describes the developments involving the expulsion of governor from the capital Maimana, Faryab 
province.  Dostum had sent the youth movement of his Junbesh party to the governor offices in a violent 
protest.  The governor fled to the airport to escape the mob.  
50 Johnson, Thomas H. “Afghanistan’s post-Taliban transition: the state of state-building after war,” 
Central Asian Survey, Vol. 25 (March-June 2006).  Afghanistan expert Thomas Johnson notes that Karzai 
was successful in removing Ismail Khan from the governor position in Heart Province.  Additionally, 
Karzai successfully removed Mohammad Fahim the Tajik minister of defense without a military uprising. 
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III. THE ECONOMICS OF WARLORDISM 
 This chapter describes the sources of revenue for Afghanistan and its warlords, 
introducing four classifications of revenue and providing a short theoretical discussion of 
stability and complexity to help classify the warlord economic environment.51   These 
four sources of warlord revenues are natural resources, taxes, illicit revenues, and 
government funds and foreign aid.  The chapter then describes how globalization affects 
warlord revenues, and includes a description of global corporations' search for oil in 
Central Asia.  The chapter closes with an assessment of the Afghan resource 
environment’s complexity and uncertainty.   
A. SOURCES OF REVENUE 
 Access to the wealth of a state creates both constraints and opportunities for the 
warlord.  There are various types of revenue. Examples include marketable resources, 
illegal trade, taxation and customs, international donor funds, etc. This chapter includes 
detailed discussion of the various types of revenue.  As a preliminary matter, it is 
important to note that different types of  revenue are more or less exploitable at the 
national or local level, with implications for the warlord who strives to dominate the 
region.  Depending on the resources, the warlord can either fight the central government 
or find some legitimate accommodation with it. 
 Scholars have emphasized the study of economic factors in civil wars and failed 
states.52  The general proposition is that revenues or sources of wealth are directly related 
to how conducive an environment is to warlordism.  Revenues include anything that a 
warlord can control with his army and transform into wealth, power or fame.   
 There are four general types of revenues.  The first includes natural resources 
such as oil, natural gas, timber, diamonds and industrial minerals.  A second type is 
51 The author's understanding of organization theory is derived from classes with Eric Janzen at the 
U.S. Naval Postgraduate School in 2006, including Organizational Design for Special Operations.  The 
application of organization theory to violent non-state actors is thoroughly discussed in Troy S. Thomas, 
Stephen D. Kiser and William D. Casebeer, Warlords Rising : Confronting Violent Non-State Actors
(Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2005), 254. 
52  P. Le Billon, "The Political Ecology of War: Natural Resources and Armed Conflicts," Political 
Geography 20, no. 5 (2001), 561–584.  Stergios Skaperdas, "Warlord Competition," Journal of Peace 
Research 39, no. 4 (July 2002, 2002), 435-446.  These articles are a representative selection. 
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revenue generated from taxing the populace and levying customs fees on travel.  The 
third type comes from illegal activities such as weapons sales, drug harvesting and 
trafficking, or the trafficking of human beings.  The fourth source of wealth is assistance 
from international donors, which includes aid from developmental organizations like the 
World Bank, reconstruction dollars and training from states like the U.S., and supplies 
and volunteers from nongovernmental organization (NGOs) such as the Red Cross.  A 
warlord might profit from all these revenue sources, including the last, which is often 
donated in order to help a state eliminate unruly warlord activities.
B. STABILITY AND COMPLEXITY 
 This thesis assesses the complexity of the warlord environment by the number of 
sectors the warlord can potentially tap into, and does not assume that, individually, any 
sector is more complex sector than another.  Stability is a function of relative changes in 
the environment.  How fast do variables change?  The pace of change will depend on the 
nature of the revenues.  Natural resources and illegal operations tend to generate unstable 
and unpredictable streams of revenue.  The more the revenue sources that are available to 
the warlord, the more complex his environment becomes.53
C. WARLORD REVENUE IN AFGHANISTAN 
 The modern Afghan economy began in the 1930’s with the establishment of 
banks, paper money, and an education system.54  The economy over the last century has 
evolved into a rentier state as described by Barnett Rubin.  In rentier states, little or no 
revenue is generated from individual income taxes. Most state revenues come from state-
owned companies and massive quantities of foreign aid.  As a consequence, the duties 
normally fueling the state, such as road tolls, border customs, and local taxes have been 
usurped by local governments, warlords and governors.  In Afghanistan, the ability of 
53  Janzen, Organizational Design for Special Operations.  The organization theory concepts “stability 
and complexity” are from models derived from a slide packet prepared by Professor Janzen in MN3121.  
This idea is part of the concept of organization fit derived from Mintzberg, an organization theorist.  H. 
Mintzberg, "Organization Design: Fashion or Fit," Harvard Business School Reprint, no. 81106 (1981).  
54  Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, "U.S. Department of State, Background Note: 
Afghanistan," Department of State, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5380.htm (accessed January 30, 
2007). 
23
local warlords to extract resources can be all-encompassing as evidenced by the 
following observation by reporter John Daniszewski: 
Residents [of Istalif – a village approximately 45 minutes north of Kabul] 
said they were still waiting for assistance, that most of their children were 
sick from contaminated water, that the grapes wouldn't grow without 
pesticides and irrigation, and that they needed their road repaired so that 
the men could get to jobs in Kabul more easily. "The warlords and 
commanders take everything," complained one man, Aghrdash Sayed 
Akram, as he sat in a room decorated with carpets and an old hunting rifle 
on the wall. "There is nothing for us poor people."55
1. Natural Resources 
 Arguably the easiest source of revenue is natural resources.  Natural resources in 
Afghanistan include oil, natural gas, timber, emeralds, and industrial minerals.  A major 
natural resource for export is the natural gas found in the northern regions near 
Sheberghan, Mazar-I-Sharif, and Sar-i-Pol.  During the 1970’s and 1980’s, the gas was 
tapped by the Afghan national natural gas company and exported to the Soviet Union for 
significant revenue.  At their peak in the 1980’s, natural gas sales yielded $300 million a 
year in export revenue, accounting for 56 percent of the national total.  However, ninety 
percent of this revenue went to the Soviet Union to pay off debt and imports.56  To 
prevent sabotage by the mujahideen, the oil fields were capped in 1989 when the Soviets 
withdrew.
   Afghan oil and gas have been extracted since the 1950’s; initial oil exploration 
was conducted by U.S. companies between 1920 and 1945.  The Soviets assisted in order 
to export the oil and gas to the Soviet Union, so resource development was not tied to 
Afghan local development.57  Local resources provide enough to pipe energy to Mazar-I-
Sharif and the Sheberghan area.  There is no gas pipeline connecting the northern fields 
55  John Daniszewski, "THE WORLD: Putting Together the Pieces of a Shattered Afghanistan," Los 
Angeles Times October 18, 2004, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=714761951&Fmt= 
7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD.  (accessed January 30, 2007). 
56  Ibid. 
57  Paul Hueper, "Energy Investment a Priority," Petroleum Economist 69, no. 12 (December 2002), 7, 
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=275548711&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD.  
(accessed January 30, 2007). 
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to Kabul, though discussions about building one are underway.58  Political instability has 
made the business very risky.   
 A 2006 U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) study estimates as much as 1.6 billion 
barrels of oil in northern Afghanistan.59  Experts such as Rob Sobhani, a Georgetown 
University academic and energy consultant, consider the pipelines and oil fields the 
centerpiece for rebuilding Afghanistan.  Pipeline royalties are estimated at $25 million a 
year for the national level government.60  Because Dostum’s power base is in the north, 
any development there will inevitably profit him in terms of wealth and power. The 
search for oil as a component of globalization is described at greater length later in this 
chapter.
 2. Local Taxes 
Taxes and custom fees levied on travel generate a second source of revenue.  
Taxation and customs duties are customarily state activities.61  When warlords take over 
taxation, the wealth they generate allows them to develop their strength at the local level, 
where they can also build a military force and use it.  State and warlord are instantly at 
odds as they compete to assume the same role.  Collusion between corrupt government 
employees and warlords deter state enforcement mechanisms, creating opportunities for 
the black or grey markets.  Rubin notes that national level leaders' failure to enforce 
58  Paul Hueper, "Energy Investment a Priority," Petroleum Economist 69, no. 12 (December 2002), 
11,http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=275548711&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD.
(accessed January 30, 2007). 
59  "Afghanistan Resource Base Larger, USGS Says," Oil & Gas Journal 104, no. 12 (Mar 27, 2006), 
34, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1021377551&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName= 
PQD. and Alexander Kliment, "Afghan Oil Reserves 'Bigger than Thought'," Financial Times, section 
World News, March 16, 2006, (accessed January 30, 2007). 
60  Daniel Fisher, "Kabuled Together," Forbes 169, no. 3 (Feb 4, 2002), 34, http://proquest.umi.com/ 
pqdweb?did=101398720&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD.  (accessed January 30, 
2007). 
61  Giustozzi, Respectable Warlords? The Politics of State building in Post-Taleban Afghanistan, 6. 
“By 2002 it was estimated that tax collection (or extortion) in the villages amounted to around US$40 
million in the whole of Afghanistan, as opposed to between US$500m. and US$600m. collected in custom 
revenues. At that time road taxes were playing a much more modest role than earlier, but custom revenues 
had been boosted by the recovery of trade activities. In some regions smuggling, especially of opium, also 
provided a useful contribution.” 
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international trade restrictions in Afghanistan give warlords an advantage.62  For 
instance, goods subject to trade restrictions between Pakistan and Iran are funneled 
through Afghanistan without censure.  Warlords collect duties as goods pass through 
their regions.  The warlords also contribute to the weakness of the state by patronizing 
particular corrupt government employees in the state apparatus. 
During the Soviet era, Dostum collected travel customs duties at Hairatan and 
passed none of them on to Kabul.63  The Hairatan port of entry controlled all trade and 
travel with the Soviet Union, including all trade with the Far East and Europe via Soviet 
rail lines.64  Dostum's unregulated control of this source of income probably funded for 
his creation of the single largest armed force in post-communist Afghanistan.  
3. Illegal Operations: Opium, Smuggling and Looting 
 The third source of revenue comes from illegal activities of various sorts.  The 
legitimacy of Hamid Karzai’s new government is challenged by its inability to curb the 
production of drugs in Afghanistan.  Opium growing, which was banned by the Taliban, 
has returned, sending vast quantities of heroin to the European market via traditional 
smuggling routes through Iran and Central Asia.  By some estimates, warlord drug 
revenues in 2003 were about $2.3 billion.65
 The warlords' drug revenue has a decade-old history. Since the late 1990's, 
warlord groups have established a system that makes them the world's largest producers 
of the opium poppy. Afghanistan was the source of 70 percent of illicit global opium 
production in 2000, the year before the Taliban banned poppy cultivation. The income 
62  Rubin and Armstrong, Regional Issues in the Reconstruction of Afghanistan, 35.  Such black or 
gray markets are a strong incentive for both government employees and regional strongmen to maintain 
weak states. Both are partners in the parallel economy through various forms of corruption. Shifts in trade 
can affect the balance of forces in Afghanistan. The shift from transit via the Pakistan-Kandahar route to 
the Iran-Herat route, for instance, has strengthened Herat and contributed to tension between the two 
regional/ethnic centers. . Official restrictions on trade items also divert India-Pakistan trade through Dubai 
and Pakistan-Iran trade through Afghanistan. 
63  Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International 
System, 275. 
64  Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International 
System, 163. 
65 Kathy Gannon, "Afghanistan Unbound" Foreign Affairs 83, no. 3 (May/Jun, 2004), 35, 
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=629305041&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD. 
(accessed January 30, 2007). 
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from this crop helped sustain the Taliban, al Qaeda, and components of the Northern 
Alliance.  It also corrupted Afghanistan's state military and law enforcement institutions 
because, to augment traditional trafficking routes through Pakistan and Iran, corrupt 
Afghani government officials and Central Asian border guards helped open new routes 
through Central Asia.66
 Smuggling has also been a significant source of warlord revenue. The trade in 
emeralds from Afghanistan’s Panjshir Valley supplies a niche grey market.  Much more 
serious, state import duties in Pakistan and India are circumvented by purchases made in 
duty free Dubai and funneled through Afghanistan.67  Not only are the Pakistani and 
Indian governments deprived of funds they would otherwise earn, but import revenues 
are also denied to Afghanistan, which hurts the smaller Afghan state government to a 
much larger degree.  In this zero sum game, diverted funds further enrich smuggler 
traditions and fuel warlord organizations and goals.   
 The legal and illegal arms trade in Central Asia has given rise to uncontrolled 
weapons proliferation. The weapons are part of what is commonly called the 
"Kalashnikov culture."  Warlords use their revenue to purchase weapons to maintain their 
armed bands. Additional weapons are introduced into the system by surrounding states 
seeking regional strategic influence.  For instance, Russia, seeking to promote its military 
industrial exports, sells arms in Uzbekistan at a discount.  Since 9/11, the United States, 
Great Britain, India, Turkey and China have all established foreign military sales or 
assistance to the Central Asian states.68
 Finally, the looting of abandoned Soviet depots has contributed to warlord 
revenue.  As an example, the former Soviet military garrison in Hairatan contained huge 
depots full of military equipment and supplies.  Dostum assumed control of the 
abandoned garrison through a subordinate allied militia leader.  Weapons from here 
enabled Dostum to recruit and reward his followers.69
66  Rubin and Armstrong, Regional Issues in the Reconstruction of Afghanistan, 33. 
67  Ibid., 33. 
68  Rubin and Armstrong, 32. 
69  Ibid., 33. 
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4. Foreign Aid 
The fourth source of revenue, international foreign aid, presents an interesting 
challenge to the dynamic between warlords and the state. Donor money is given to the 
state conditionally. The state must become more streamlined and efficient; it must show 
results.  But, to co-opt warlords in order to gain concessions or access to warlord-
controlled areas, the state may offer them some of its foreign aid.70  Davis relates the 
statements of an unnamed Soviet diplomat illustrating this. 
In 1989 [Dostum] had a budget for 45,000 troops, but we knew he had 
only 25,000 on his payroll.  When our advisers confronted him over it, 
he'd laugh and say, `Don't worry, I'll get hold of the other 20,000 if they're 
needed.' The Soviets kept paying.71
 Passing along foreign aid to warlords can begin the treacherous process of 
legitimizing and integrating them into the state system.72  In 1992, Dostum had foreign 
benefactors in the border states of Uzbekistan and Turkey.  In 1992, Dostum skimmed off 
$6 million dollars from a $10 million dollar Turkish donation to his Junbesh party.73
From his home base in Mazar, Dostum established his own diplomatic mission to 
Uzbekistan as well as to Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Turkmenistan and 
Tajikistan.  To escape the devastating civil war in Kabul, the UN established its main 
office in Mazar as well.74  Aid does not come without some public relations work on the 
part of the regional warlords, who have learned to use the media and public relations to 
gain fame and wealth.  Dostum became internationally known by cooperating with the 
UN to assist over 60,000 Tajik refugees in May 1993.75
70  Giustozzi, Respectable Warlords? The Politics of State building in Post-Taleban Afghanistan, 15. 
“Hamid Karzai and his allies within the transitional government opted, in the short term, to create a ‘feudal’ 
state, co-opting the warlords into a state structure with a variety of functions, ranging from military 
commander to minister. At the same time, it’s the transitional government’s medium and long-term plans 
are to try to weaken the power of the warlords using a wide range of tools.” 
71  Davis, Makeover for a Warlord, 46. 
72  Giustozzi, Respectable Warlords? The Politics of State building in Post-Taleban Afghanistan, 5. 
“The central government extended patronage to local commanders to expand political influence and ensure 
protection.  Unfortunately, the central government had little control over what they had created.”   
73  Antonio Giustozzi, The Ethnicization of an Afghan Faction: Junbesh-I I-Milli from its Origins to 
the Presidential Elections (London: Crisis States Research Center,[2005]), 4. 
74  Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International 
System, 275. 
75  Rubin, 275. 
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D. GLOBALIZATION 
 The global marketplace generates demand for a variety of goods and resources.   
Customers a world away seek ever increasing quantities of oil, timber, drugs, weapons, 
and diamonds; with global communications and transportation, they have the means to 
obtain them.  For example, Pakistan, India and China all have escalating demands for 
energy, including gas and oil from the Central Asian Republics.  Pakistani gas reserves 
will be depleted by 201076 while Indian gas consumption will double by 2012.77
 Globalization policies have stressed already weak states.  Meanwhile, there has 
been more activism among international developmental organizations such as the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  Development programs increasingly 
aim to streamline state institutions, making them more efficient, but smaller.  In the 
process, the budget slashing weakens already weak states.78
 To participate in the global marketplace, a state needs a physical infrastructure. 
The United States provided assistance to build Afghanistan’s major highway, which 
winds its way between Kabul and Kandahar through five provinces where thirty-five 
percent of the country’s population lives.79  The route has been plagued by instability, 
beginning with the Soviet invasion from the north, followed by the Taliban expansion 
from the south.  Post-Taliban, the Karzai government plans to extend the route past 
Kandahar to Herat and to Mazar-I-Sharif, and then back to Kabul, creating a “ring road” 
tying the country together.  Three quarters of the road has been funded with an estimated 
completion date in 2007.    
76  Scott Baldauf, "Afghan 'Pipe Dream' Draws Closer to Reality ; A Proposed Gas Pipeline from 
Turkmenistan to Arabian Sea could Boost Jobs, Investment." Christian Science Monitor May 13, 2005, 
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=838156351&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD.  
Pakistan has doubled its energy output from 1999 to 2005.  In 2005 it was expending 4 billion cubic feet 
per day.  By 2015, it will need to import 2.5 billion cubic feet per day.   
77  Aaron Chaze, "India Takes the Plunge with Trans-Asia Natural Gas Pipeline," Global Finance, no. 
9 (Oct, 2006), 10, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1139254301&Fmt=7&clientId= 
65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD, (accessed January 30, 2007). 
78  Lezhnev, Crafting Peace: Strategies to Deal with Warlords in Collapsing States, 17. “These 
policies have aimed at creating a “slim, streamlined, ideal” state whose agencies and budgets are cut in the 
name of fiscal austerity, whose services are privatized and whose direct links to multinational firms are 
secured (Reno, 1998).” 
79  Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, "U.S. Department of State, Background Note: 
Afghanistan," Department of State, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5380.htm (accessed January 30, 
2007). 
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 In areas of the world with untapped oil and gas resources like Afghanistan, 
commercial interests from abroad have begun building roads and lines of 
communications into interior areas more quickly than the state can expand its ability to 
govern, which exacerbates the state’s already weak condition.80  Until the U.S. sponsored 
ring road is complete, Afghan warlords will continue to fill the socioeconomic void by 
transforming their military control of a region into a system which gives them control of 
locally-generated revenues.81
 Warlords capitalize on state weakness. The expansion of commercial enterprises 
and the arms trade in particular directly benefits from the weakness of the state.82
However, Mackinlay cautions against easy answers and overgeneralizations, warning of 
the risk of treating the concept of globalization "as a one-fits-all explanation for all sorts 
of trouble, removing the need for more wide-ranging research on the internal 
contradictions of those states which are weakening or collapsing."83  It can be concluded 
that while globalization did not give rise to warlordism or the collapse of states, it has 
likely magnified the reach and wealth of otherwise isolated warlords. 
E. THE SEARCH FOR OIL  
The global demand for petroleum products has sent nations to politically unstable 
regions like Afghanistan. Charles Baker, from the USGS team in Sheberghan working to 
resurvey petroleum fields that were capped after the 1989 Soviet withdrawal, describes 
80  Mackinlay, John. Globalisation and Insurgency. Adelphi Papers., edited by Mats Berdal R. 352nd 
ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002, 5-6. “There were fewer wild and unreachable areas within a 
state and, in an intangible sense; there was less cultural space, less separation between states…. A surge of 
communications of every kind seemed to be dragging individuality away from the state, away from the 
distinct communities and ethnic groups towards a global culture…” 
81  Lezhnev, Crafting Peace: Strategies to Deal with Warlords in Collapsing States, 17. “Those who 
can take control of diamonds, narcotics, or similar resources—often warlords—can now deal directly with 
foreign firms for maximum extraction and profit.” 
82 Neil Cooper, "The Arms Trade and Internal Conflict" in Warlords in International Politics, ed. Paul 
B. Rich  (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 28.  Political scientist Neil Cooper notes, “The proliferation 
of arms within weak states is more likely to produce acute versions of the security dilemma than it is to 
produce stable deterrence, making conflict more and not less likely.” 
83  Mackinlay, Globalisation and Insurgency, 5-6. 
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the area's potential as including "about 142 billion cubic meters … of proven oil and gas 
reserves and up to 765 billion cubic meters … in unproven reserves."84
 For any resource to be marketable there must be a way to get it from its original 
location to commercial enterprises that will place it on the global market.  Local 
warlords, with their local or regional monopoly on the use of force, control access to 
resources and are positioned to work directly with international corporations, with or 
without the consent of the state.  However, the international movement of resources 
means that the warlord must decide whether to make arrangements with the state to work 
at the national level, or operate clandestinely and without state cooperation. 
 Multinational corporations have actively sought out deals with non-state actors in 
conflict zones.  The energy needs of Pakistan, India, and China inspire companies like 
Argentina's Brindas Petroleum and the U.S.’s UNOCAL to consider developing pipelines 
from the oil and gas reserves in the Central Asian republics in the Caspian Sea basin 
through Afghanistan to the Indian Ocean or the Pakistani gas energy grid.  The Brindas 
CEO reportedly met with the Taliban leaders in Kandahar during the civil war, while 
UNOCAL flew Taliban delegates to its headquarters in Houston, Texas. Brindas 
subsequently lost a court battle with UNOCAL for the Afghan pipeline rights.85
However, UNOCAL abandoned its pipeline dreams after the 1998 American missile 
strikes into Afghanistan.86 Current efforts to construct energy pipelines are led by the 
Asian Development Bank with a consortium of multinational oil corporations and the 
Central Asian Republics.87  If the pipelines are built, increased jobs, security contracts, 
infrastructure and local taxes will be a significant boon to local warlords.
84  Giustozzi, 68.  The Russian government refuses to share the seismic line charts from the 1970s.  
The USGS team is secured by Australian NATO forces against local armed groups; see "Asia: And there's 
another Country; Afghanistan," The Economist 368, no. 8341 (September 13, 2003), 68. 
85  Fisher, Kabuled Together, 34, In a much publicized story, Brindas Chairman Carlos Bulgheroni 
met with Taliban leaders in Kandahar in early 1997. The Taliban delegates were also treated to a visit of 
the NASA Space Center in Houston, TX. Brindas sued UNOCAL unsuccessfully in a California court, 
alleging that UNOCAL had stolen their idea. 
86  Daud Khan, "Afghanistan: Volatile Security Issues Threaten Pipeline Plans," Pajhwok Afghan 
News, sec. Global Information Network, August 30, 2006. 
87  Hueper, Energy Investment a Priority, 12 
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F. CONCLUSION  
 Warlord economics is about the variety of potential warlord revenues available to 
finance warlord groups.   There are four revenue sources: natural resources, taxes, illicit 
activities, and foreign aid.  Under the communist regime, Dostum ran a militia 
organization funded reliably by the government.  He was able to augment his militia 
funding through taxation and levying fees.  When Afghan central authority disintegrated, 
the state plunged into civil war in 1992.  The opportunities for revenue abounded, but the 
number of adversaries increased.  The new environment could be described as an 
increasingly complex one.  The following chapter identifies the main political resources 
and population bases that Dostum uses as a source of power to advance his warlord 
organization.
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IV. POPULATION BASES WARLORD ORGANIZATION 
This chapter analyzes the impacts of traditional social systems on the stability of 
armed and political groups. Ethnic, tribal, and qawm-based organizations are a stable 
basis of social mobilization only at the grass roots level of the village, family, or valley.  
As elaborated later in this chapter, qawm refers to a local grouping of persons based on 
location often related to family or profession.  The unstable changing alliances and blood 
feuding in a population with shared values is exactly what establishes order in traditional 
societies.  A traditional society does not naturally extend above the local level.  Above 
the local level, and especially at the national level, kinship organizations are prone to 
instability, which makes organizations that attempt to mobilize populations based on  
ideology also prone to instability.  A warlord who establishes an organization on a 
military basis, will have better long-term success at adapting and gaining power.   
A. POPULATION BASES 
The Afghans are hardly a people, much less a nation.  They are a nation of 
tribes constantly at war with each other.  They are very heterogeneous, 
with an ethnocentrism which makes them not only hate or suspect 
foreigners, but Afghans living two valleys away.88
 Diversity in Afghanistan affects the ability of warlords and the state to mobilize 
the population. Some warlords have based their bands on traditional tribal or qawm
sources of manpower.  Others have developed multiethnic armed bands.  Historically, 
traditional Afghan monarchs and colonial powers suppressed ethnic bases of population 
that tried to mobilize at the national and even the regional level.  With the fall of the 
communist regime in 1991, however, warlord politics reemerged, and warlords drew 
great strength and developed population support from on ethnic movements.  Dostum 
started with his gas field security forces and transformed them into a military-like strike 
force.  With the communist regime's collapse, this force maintained its allegiance to 
Dostum and became a militia which he could pay and control.  This is probably why his  
militias have been stable in comparison to many qawm-based militias.  Dostum’s 
88 The quote is from Howard Hunt, in George Crile, Charlie Wilson's War: The Extraordinary Story of 
how the Wildest Man in Congress and a Rogue CIA Agent Changed the History of our Times (New York: 
Grove Press, 2003), 224. 
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Northern Movement formed a political organization that then mobilized ethnic 
populations to join his camp.   
1. Ethnic Distribution 
Afghanistan is composed of multiple minority groups, and no one group has more 
than 50 percent of the population.  The state of Afghanistan elicits no real sense of 
nationalism that equates to the state itself; its borders were established only to buffer the 
Russian and British empires of the 1800’s.89   To understand the location of the major 
groups, one might visualize the Hindu Kush mountains dividing the state from southwest 
to northeast.  The ethnic pockets fall on either side of this natural border, their locations 
corresponding closely to the surrounding states surrounding Afghanistan.
 The Pushtuns, the largest group, live mainly in the south and east in areas 
bordering Pakistan, although some Pushtuns colonized pockets of the north. The Tajiks 
live in the northeast, near Tajikistan, while the Turkic groups, the Turkmen and Uzbeks, 
settled in the northern provinces adjacent to Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan respectively.  
The last significant minority group, the Hazara, occupy the central highland area of 
Bamiyan.  Experts agree that any simple classification of Afghan society is transient, 
because the population is historically very mobile. 90
2. Tribes  
 The Afghan demographic landscape, while complex, is much like that of other 
states with traditional societies. People's first and most basic unit of identity is the family 
with patriarchal lines of descent.  What differentiates tribal societies from state 
dominated societies is that in the former, familial ties translate into political power 
beginning at the local level.91  At the grassroots, tribal relations provide a mechanism for 
89 Ian Bedford, "Nationalism and Belonging in India, Pakistan and South Central Asia: Some 
Comparative Observations," Australian Journal of Anthropology, no. Special Issue 7: The National Artifice 
(August 1996), 6, http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2472/is_n2_v7/ai_18912022/pg_6 (accessed 
January 16, 2007). “Although there has never been such a thing as an Afghan nation, there is certainly an 
Afghan state whose history can be traced . . .” 
90 Nyrop and Seekins, Afghanistan Country Study http://countrystudies.us/afghanistan/37.htm . 
(accessed January 30, 2007). 
91 Nyrop and Seekins, http://www.gl.iit.edu/govdocs/afghanistan/EthnicityAndTribe.html. (accessed 
January 30, 2007). 
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local service and security through the family.  The degree to which tribal leaders can 
muster tribal members to a cause or to armed conflict is based on blood ties.  Violations 
of tribal rules and values obligate family members to act, often violently, to restore lost 
honor.  Rubin notes that such acts generally characterized as “blood feuds” are the main 
instruments for control and justice in tribal societies.92  Agreements and bonds are always 
tighter among closer blood relations.93
3. Tribal Factors in Armed Groups  
For a warlord, access to tribal networks for support has advantages and 
disadvantages.  On one hand, tribal bonds are strong because kinship is the basis of 
identity, political allegiance and predictable behavior.  Tribal militias are thus preexisting 
forces that are inherently cohesive and good at conducting warfare locally.  On the other 
hand, however responsive a tribal armed force is to the call of the local level jirga, it has 
inefficiencies as well.   Tribal organizations do not give allegiance to a central authority 
for dispute resolution.  Ernest Gellner says that “the most characteristic institution of such 
a society” is feuding among sub-groups. 94  Leadership is inherently weak and discipline 
is usually controlled by tribal laws, not by leaders.  Because a feud could fracture it, tribal 
organization is inherently unstable.  Additionally, tribal militias are not responsive to 
long-term plans and are more obligated to local needs.  Thus, in comparison to secular 
militias, ethnic militias are generally less effective.  For these reasons, Gellner notes, 
warlords often supplemented their tribal force with outside mercenaries or slaves.95
4. Khans and Qawms   
 Though all Afghans are conscious of their lineage though the father, the qawm,
the Arabic term for tribe, is another key social grouping for encapsulating local-level 
92 Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International 
System, 10.  As Nyrop observes, “Thus the grandsons of the same grandfather might oppose one another on 
a certain issue but join together if necessary to oppose the descendants of the brother of their common great 
grandfather.” 
93 Nyrop and Seekins, http://www.gl.iit.edu/govdocs/afghanistan/EthnicityAndTribe.html. (accessed 
January 30, 2007). 
94 Ernest Gellner, "Tribalism and the State in the Middle East" in Tribes and State Formation, eds. 
Philip Khouri  S. and Joseph Kostiner (Berkley: University of California Press, 1990), 109. 
95 Gellner, Tribalism and the State in the Middle East, 109. 
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society.  It clearly entails more than just blood relations.  Canfield refers to a qawm in 
Hazarajat as the "common local term for a spatially and socially united group of people 
… [whose] members are united by agnatic [patrilineal] kinship, have a common home 
territory, and enjoy warm social fellowship."96
 Detachment from the national government is a fact at the local level.  The khan, a 
local landowner, has a normal working relationship with the populace although he may 
not be a part of the qawm.  State-appointed local representatives may not belong to the 
qawm either. The khan may use traditional forms of influence like wealth and kinship to 
maintain political allegiance or may in fact have no family ties to the qawm he attempts 
to rule.  Rubin notes:
A khan is not a feudal lord.  Power in villages or tribes does not reside in 
any one person or structure but in fluidly structured networks of influence.  
These networks are not based on any single principle; neither wealth nor 
kinship ties alone can assure a man of influence, only the skill with which 
he deploys both against rivals.  The main object of politics as practiced by 
khans is to be recognized as “bigger” than other khans by both villager 
and the state.97
 Depending on the region, a qawm may encompass a village or a group of villages 
of single or mixed tribal membership.  Ian Bedford explains that the complexity of the 
grouping may extend to other areas: “Its sociological basis is tribe, clan, professional 
group (qawm of the mullahs or  Barbers), caste (the Bari of Nuristan), religious group 
(the sayyad), ethnic group (munjani), village community or simply an extended 
family.”98  For the local khan, this complex arrangement constitutes his local patronage 
network.
96 Nyrop and Seekins, Afghanistan Country Study, http://www.gl.iit.edu/govdocs/afghanistan/ 
EthnicityAndTribe.html. (accessed January 30, 2007). 
97 Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan : State Formation and Collapse in the International 
System, 41. 
98 Bedford, Nationalism and Belonging in India, Pakistan and South Central Asia: Some Comparative 
Observations, 6. Of course, this simplifies Afghan society, and some qawm are not in a relationship with a 
khan.  However, these qawms pose no significant threat to the central government since they cannot 
mobilize.  Historically, the concern has always been focused on the qawm with ties to a khan, a relationship 
in which, Roy says, “the state was always directed to one end, the neutralization of the qawm and, with 
that, of any autonomous agency-from-below." 
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 Because tribal leaders and elders may not exert absolute authority, tensions arise 
when a local khan, warlord or state official tries to exert his influence overt the tribe.  
Often, the tribal leaders live in an “acephalous” (“headless”) egalitarian social 
environment, in which a system of obligations and customs provide order.99  Important 
decisions are not directed at anyone to carry out.  An understanding of what must happen 
is agreed upon and that understanding is the way things are in the tribe from then on. 
Qawm and tribal based organizations are inherently unstable because of the 
tenuous relationships between khans and qawms and because of the qawms' and tribes' 
internal social struggles.  Such organizations can offer a base for armed groups, but an 
unstable one.  The source of patronage, whether monetary or family or professional, must 
remain strong for the leader to control his group.   
B. ETHNIC FACTORS IN POLITICAL MOBILIZATION AND GROWTH  
 The previous discussion implies that ethnicity in itself was never a source of 
traditional hierarchical authority.  Taken to an extreme, ethnic politics involves blood 
lines and family members extending out to all those in a particular ethnic group, and thus 
the ethnic group are like an extended family.  A political entrepreneur who can gain 
approval for this idea can claim an ethnic group is obliged to mobilize behind his cause, 
as brother supporting brother.  An example Nyrop notes is the mujahideen phenomenon.   
Although there is no belief that Muslims share a common descent, the 
shared goals, opposition to other groups (i.e., non-believing atheists), 
affective ties, and group liability of mujahideen are reminiscent of 
familial, tribal, and ethnic group construction. As such, the appeal of the 
mujahideen must be strongly familiar.100
 Mobilization of nationwide tribal and ethnic groups has not been the norm in 
Afghanistan’s history.  Realizing the dangers of such a powerful threat to centralized 
power, the Durrani monarchs always sought to suppress such movements, and state 
representatives overseeing the traditional qawm-based grouping of khans and villagers 
tried to keep tribal law isolated at the local level.  This is also typical of a weak state 
attempting to retain social control by weakening society through fragmentation.  During 
99 Class notes. Naval postgraduate School SO3750, Anthropology of Conflict, Fall 2005.  
100 Nyrop and Seekins, Afghanistan Country Study.
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the monarchy, the appointed malik was sometimes not a qawm member, but in those 
cases his power was limited.  Responsibility for social services and security remained 
with the khan or tribal leaders who controlled the qawm.  Consequently, the state in fact 
never extended true institutional control out into the countryside to maintain state-to-
population control.101  With no state apparatus to integrate the populace into state run 
organizations, the people had no effective representation of the state level.  As long as the 
central authority had the wealth or resources to patronize the khans through their malik, 
nominal acquiescence to the central authority was achieved.
 The Durrani monarchy suppressed nationwide ethnic mobilization, because it 
desired to avert the rise of a warlord environment.  Oliver Roy notes that the Soviet 
withdrawal and downfall of the communist regime opened an opportunity for the 
warlords.
From the top to the bottom of the complex scale of ethnic identity, that is, 
from the linguistic group to the village level, the traditional segmentation 
of Afghan society underlines and reinforces political fragmentation.  If 
qawm affiliation is the rule of the political game at the grass roots level, 
ethnicity might be now the bigger stake in nationwide policy… 102
Afghanistan expert Thomas Johnson points out the rise of ethno-linguistic 
politics in Afghanistan’s national politics.  His analysis concludes that in addition 
to top-down “constitutionally guaranteed” policies to confront ethnic issues, 
“bottom to the top” demands will force compromise.103  How the issues resolve 
themselves will determine whether the people have faith in the effectiveness of 
the government. 
C. QAWM BASED MILITIAS 
 Organizations can expand through ethnic mobilization but such organizations are 
not always stable.  Such is the case in regards to the development of militias.  The 
101 Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan : State Formation and Collapse in the International 
System, 25. 
102 Roy, the Lessons of the Soviet/Afghan War, 61. 
103 Johnson, Thomas H. “Afghanistan’s post-Taliban transition: the state of state-building after war,” 
Central Asian Survey, Vol. 25 (March-June 2006), 15. 
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Afghan militias were formed during the Khalq party's communist regime. They reported 
to the Ministry of the Interior until 1985, and then to the Ministry of Nationalities and 
Tribes.  In both the 1978 coup and the 1992 communist resignation, the regular armed 
forces seemed to simply disintegrate, garrison by garrison, through defection. This makes 
it hard to compare commanders of these militias to warlord leaders like Dostum.  Many 
military leaders defected to the emergent militia, ethnic or jihadi leaders, including 
Dostum, Massood and Hekmatyar.  It is important to note that the jihadi based formations 
survived and became stronger in the collapsed state environment.  Dostum’s militia based 
formation also grew in the new environment, but more as a result of his military 
legitimacy rather than his ethnic or religious appeal.
 Of five militias discussed by Rubin, all but Dostum's were based on qawms or 
tribes.104  The qawm-based militias were plagued by infighting and internal discipline 
problems.  Soon after his appointment as commander, Juma Khan of the Andarabi militia 
was assassinated by Ahmad Shah Massood, a tribal rival from an adjoining valley.105
Ismatullah Muslim of the Achakzai militia was a smuggler from a smuggling family and 
tribe.  His leadership was very unstable, and he died in 1991 of drug and alcohol 
abuse.106  The fate of these tribal-based militia leaders provides an obvious contrast to the 
survival of Dostum’s secular militia. 
D. DOSTUM’S MILITIA 
 The warlord organization dominates the populace, not to gain legitimacy, but to 
recruit warriors, extort taxes from local producers in the form of taxes and customs, or 
simply to mobilize workers or clear away villages for the commercial extraction of 
globally marketable resources.  Its ability to accomplish these goals through force reflects 
the warlord acknowledged military legitimacy.  The warlord modus operandi becomes 
war for money, especially as the wealth generated through these revenues provides the  
104 Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan : State Formation and Collapse in the International 
System, 158. 
105 Ibid., 158. 
106 Ibid., 159. 
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warlord with sums far exceeding what he requires to support his warrior forces.  The 
wealth generated compares with the commercial activities of some international 
corporations107.
Under the communist regime, Dostum’s militia evolved from a security force 
designed to guard the natural gas fields to a mobile national strike force.  
Organizationally, it was funded by the national government, salaries paid by Najibullah at 
twice the rate of regular army soldiers.  As the regime’s budget began to wane with the 
withdrawal of Soviet and Eastern Block donor funds, the central government scrutinized 
Dostum’s funding, even to the point of accusing Dostum of reporting false numbers of 
militia in order to inflate his funding.  During this time Dostum already had control of 
custom duties of the main Soviet port of entry into Afghanistan, which provided the 
revenue to run his militia, the best equipped in Afghanistan. 
 After the cessation of Soviet funding to Afghanistan, the Najibullah regime’s days 
were numbered.  At this time, Dostum sought to consolidate control over his own forces, 
which meant cutting off contact with Najibullah since his militia reported to no other 
higher authority.  Dostum took this step, breaking ties with the regime and allying with 
Massood and the mujahideen forces against the government. 
After the fall of the communist regime, Dostum was able to keep together his pool 
of Uzbek militias and garrisons, totaling 120,000 men.108  He was able to do this because 
he could offer “salaries and career prospects.”  He even was able to recruit members 
outside his ethnic group.  Pushtun army officers, fleeing from other areas of Afghanistan, 
joined with Dostum as well as Pushtun Mujahideen commanders.  With these men, he 
kept control of airfields, road, and fuel depots all of which he needed in order to maintain 
his fighting force in the north and in Kabul.109
 The Jauzjani militia was a secular non-affiliated military division.  Unlike most 
other militias, Dostum’s force did not correspond to any traditional Afghani qawm.110
107  Mackinlay, Defining Warlords, 9,  “What was new about these new warlords, and was 
exhaustively reported by the second phase of writers [economic warlord theory], was that their commercial 
agenda had become extremely sophisticated, in some cases involving huge international trading accounts.” 
108  Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International 
System, 275. 
109  Ibid., 275. 
110  Ibid., 161. 
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However, despite the multiethnic composition of his force, Dostum was effective at 
utilizing long held Uzbek grievances against the Durrani landlords, recruiting Uzbek 
soldiers. This gained him greater support from Uzbekistan and standing among the local 
tribes.  The multiethnic character of his forces is significant in that bringing in outside 
mercenaries no doubt helped check the tribal inefficiencies of purely mono-ethnic forces.
 In 2001, Dostum’s relations with Uzbekistan were such that Uzbekistan sent 
troops to serve under Dostum’s command.  Even today, Dostum gains recruits from 
Uzbekistan and it is reported that a portion of Dostum’s personal bodyguard team is 
composed of Uzbek Special-Forces.111
1. Warriors 
 In the case of simple warlord organizations, what a warlord says goes.  As a 
warlord organization becomes more complex, the culture changes, often as warriors’ 
goals become more distanced from that of the warlord himself.  
 The warlord and his warriors do not always operate in hierarchical organizations 
based on discipline and sound military tactics.  John Mackinlay notes that their norms, 
like the warlord’s, are based on self-fulfillment, often instilled as a part of recruitment 
when traditional ties to family and village are broke112.  Warriors learn to be motivated 
by what they can personally get out of the use of force.  Getting paid and attending to 
personal matters are important goals.  Outside the training and arms bestowed by the 
occasional foreign military advisor, warriors are not exposed to nor are they interested in 
formal military training.  
 Keeping members loyal is critical.  This is often done through fear.  It is also done 
through forcing new recruits/ abductees to shift their tribal obligations.  They are forced 
to kill their friends or relatives as a test.  Once such an act is committed, the warrior is 
outcast from his tribe and thrown back to his only sanctuary, the warlord organization.  
Other methods of maintaining membership have to do with fostering and satisfying 
111 Asia: And there's another Country; Afghanistan, 68. 
112  Mackinlay, Defining Warlords, 8, “Recruits in some West African factions were also forced to 
reject the influence of their traditional family and village hierarchy. In some cases, indoctrination required 
them to commit atrocities against their own communities. In many instances, recruits had to be renamed as 
if to throw off the ties of family tradition and adopt warrior names. This detachment from their social 
context probably made them more effective as fighters, but less responsible for their terrible conduct.” 
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greed.  Members are paid well compared to other employment, if it is even available, and 
then are often given the chance to take in the spoils of war.113  As Moreau notes, the 
warriors live, breath, and eat in an environment of weapons: 
The wealth of these guys is tied to their guns.  Without guns they can't 
extort money, collect taxes or customs duties. Their rivers of revenue will 
dry up. 114 
 Warlord tactics are often more akin to demonstrations and deception operations 
that serve to convey the threat of force in lieu of actually using it.115  Warlord armies find 
that such acts invoke terror and are a justified means to achieving their ends. 
Dostum's mercenary troops achieved notoriety for ruthless courage on the 
battlefield and wild indiscipline off it. Bearing a legacy of 200 years near 
the bottom of a Pushtun-dominated social order, they seemed to take a 
special delight in evening the historical score, killing Pushtun mujahideen 
of the south, and looting and terrorizing the civilians. 116
 If terror tactics fail, violence frequently occurs in chaotic, poorly coordinated 
engagement of untrained, unskilled shooters.  Casualties are often low, especially 
compared to those of non-combatant, unarmed participants.   In the instances when 
warlord armies are well armed and display proficiency in firing their weapons, the reason 
is usually a past history of training by foreign state or private security organizations.117
Baryalai, a subordinate warlord, summarizes Dostum’s warlord method of social control: 
It's this hobby he has. He gives people money, and then he sends them at 
you, like attack dogs coming at your face.118
113  Lezhnev, Crafting Peace: Strategies to Deal with Warlords in Collapsing States, 2-4. 
114  Moreau, Walking a Fine Line; “Hamid Karzai is a National Treasure, but can he be President of 
Afghanistan?” 26.  These are statements of Abdul Malik, 40, a former warlord, businessman, and aspiring 
politician. 
115  Mackinlay, Defining Warlords, 8, “They rely instead on their frightening behavior and 
appearance, and their combat effectiveness is largely symbolic. They are organized around the magnetism 
of their leaders, which implies that they do not have to rely on a rigorously maintained warfare capability 
for their survival.” 
116  Davis, Makeover for a Warlord, 46. 
117  John Mackinlay, "Warlords," RUSI Journal 143, no. 2 (April 1998), 24. 
118  Caryl, “The Ways of a Warlord; as Factional Fighting Returns to Afghanistan, at Least One 
would-be Warlord is Trying to Bring Peace by Taking Away Weapons, Not Wielding them,” 10. 
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2. Warlord Leadership 
The Uzbek people, the roughest and toughest of all Central Asian 
nationalities, are noted for their love of marauding and 
pillaging….Mahmoud Ibn Wali, a sixteenth century historian, described 
the early Uzbeks as 'famed for their bad nature, swiftness, audacity and 
boldness' and reveling in their outlaw image. Little has changed in the 
Uzbek desire for power and influence since then.119
Warlord leadership is a product of their history.  Sasha Lezhnev notes that 
warlords were dissatisfied with their previous military lives because of the inherent 
obstacles of upward mobility conflicting with their desire to seek greater power.  Also 
warlords generally have a narrow view of the world, “believing that one person, rather a 
complex series of political institutions, can wield power.” 120  This is due to a low level 
of education along with ignorance which breeds a distrust of institutions.  The result is a 
self centered outlook on the world. 
 However, warlords such as Dostum, though having a narrow world view, know 
how to deal with the local population.  Also, even Dostum knows that his tone must 
change in the presence of worldwide media coverage.  Robert Young Pelton, the only 
American journalist to have interviewed Dostum [in 2002], observes the level at which 
Dostum has recreated his image: 
People seem to think leaders take power in Afghanistan, but actually they 
give you power, because they think that you will treat them fairly, listen to 
their needs. When I saw Dostum talking with his people he was trying to 
communicate that it was okay for them to talk amongst themselves and 
dissent and have elections. He was saying that he couldn't fix all their 
problems for them that they would have to elect leaders and do things for 
themselves. 121
 In some respects his reputation increased his considerable power and fame 
amongst the local populations and overseas as well, both key audiences the warlord 
seeks.  Uzbeks are regarded as the most rugged and severe of all the ethnicities of Central 
Asia.  However, as Giustozzi notes, the locals were likely amenable to Dostum’s 
119  Ann Marlowe, “‘Warlords’ and ‘Leaders’," National Review, 
http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-marlowe021802.shtml (accessed January 30, 2007). 
Ann Marlowe writes for the National Review Online.  This is a quote from journalist Ahmed Rashid. 
120  Lezhnev, Crafting Peace: Strategies to Deal with Warlords in Collapsing States, 2-4. 
121  Marlowe, "Warlords" and "Leaders", 1.   
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“Uzbek” ruthlessness so long as the warlord’s warriors were maintaining order in the 
region as opposed to ravaging the local populace.122  As a result, Dostum never felt the 
need to build a significant public relations machine at the grass roots, and did little to 
counter his ruthless reputation until 2002, when he finally decided to trade in his uniform 
for a business suit as a member of the future Afghani government.123
3. Adversaries 
 Since warlords themselves use force to deter their adversaries, they must always 
be wary of potential force used against them.  In Afghanistan, a person with Dostum’s 
history has made plenty of enemies.  Among them are the Taliban, who have gone 
underground since 2001.  An incident in 2005 shows how such personal hatreds are 
dangerous in Afghanistan.  Dostum was in the process of recasting his image as a 
legitimate politician; however, he still traveled with heavy security.  The Taliban, whose 
stronghold is in the southeastern portion of Afghanistan near the Pakistan border, 
managed a suicide attack on Dostum in Sheberghan, Dostum’s stronghold.  Using 
cunning and deception, the suicide bomber approached Dostum’s entourage dressed as an 
unthreatening beggar during the Muslim festival of Eid ul-Adha, the celebration of 
sacrifice.  Even a thug such as Dostum could not publicly turn away a beggar during this 
period.  The beggar got close to Dostum’s bodyguards when he set off his bomb.  Dostum 
managed to escape unhurt, but 20 people were injured in the attack.124
E. CONCLUSION 
An optimal warlord organization is a good fit for the Afghan environment.  In 
simple environments, the warlord exercises direct control over his subordinates.  In 
highly complex environments, the patron network may reach out horizontally to other 
warlords, state institutions, international actors, illegal-clandestine actors, and any other 
partners.
122  Giustozzi, Respectable Warlords? The Politics of State building in Post-Taleban Afghanistan, 8. 
123  Giustozzi, Respectable Warlords? The Politics of State building in Post-Taleban Afghanistan, 8. 
124  Shiv Malik, "Warlords' Threat to Secede," New Statesman 18, no. 845 (Feb 7, 2005), 2, 
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=793106531&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD. 
(accessed January 30, 2007). 
45
 Dostum’s early organization, the 53rd Division, was a pure military organization, 
with dedicated revenues coming from the state and foreign donors.  Therefore the 
resource environment could be classified as simple.  However, even back in the 1980’s 
and early 1990’s, Dostum worked in both the legal and illegal environments, siphoning 
revenue from the state.  His operations involved collecting customs fees at Hairatan 
which should have been forwarded to Kabul.  Thus, his organization can be seen as 
transitioning to operating in a more complex environment.   
 Due to weakness of the state, Dostum never really felt threatened by the prospect 
of the state stopping his illegal activities.  Thus, the environment in the 1980s could be 
considered stable.  At the time of the fall of the Najibullah regime, he commanded a 
division-sized element, which was probably the largest organization operating at the 
tactical level.  Dostum established standing operating procedures through fear and 
ruthless leadership to ensure consistent behavior from his subordinates.  Additionally, he 
received considerable government funding to maintain his well-paid militia. 
In conclusion, it is very difficult to sustain a military organization based on an 
ethnic base, and even more challenging to maintain a political movement based on 
ethnicity.  How coherent a warlord organization is depends on whether it is secular or 
founded on a specific population base.  A warlord who establishes an organization on a 
stable base, such as secular military one, will have better success.  And as the next 
chapter discusses, if the environment becomes favorable for political change (i.e. the state 
collapses), a warlord organization with a stable secular base can grow by politicizing 
ethnic and tribal populations with relatively steady and productive results. 
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V. WARLORD POLITICAL ORGANIZATION 
 Dostum’s political rise results from his military legitimacy, which gave him a 
stable power base.  Political mobilization at the national level requires politically trained 
entrepreneurs with a strategy to establish, build and maintain power.  Though Dostum is a 
canny man with much experience, he would not have been as successful without his 
military reputation.   
 This chapter traces how warlords build political legitimacy from their military 
base.  It describes political changes in Afghanistan during Dostum’s life, followed by 
discussion of the origin of his Junbesh party and of the Turkic population base that 
eventually assumed the party's political leadership.  This is followed by a description of 
Dostum’s gradual shift from military to political activities, including consideration of his 
political campaigning, political demands and compromises, and his difficult public 
relations.  Throughout this transformation, he maintains his warlord characteristics.
A.  DOSTUM IN THE CONTEXT OF AFGHANISTAN’S CHANGING 
POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT 
Since 1979, the environment in Afghanistan went through four overlapping 
periods, alternating phases of coercive centralized control and of warlordism.  The four 
periods are the Soviet occupation, the Afghan civil war, the rule of the Taliban, and the 
post Taliban environment.  
1. Soviet Occupation 
 The period of Soviet occupation is marked by jihadi forces' global efforts to expel 
the Soviets, who occupied Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989, propping up a puppet regime.  
During this time, Dostum achieved legitimacy as a successful career military man.  He 
was a member of the party and surrounded himself with communist advisors.  His militia 
grew as it guarded the Afghan national gas fields.   Dostum himself gained stature among 
his military subordinates, President Najibullah, and foreign supporters in the Soviet 
Union, Uzbekistan, and Iran.  His defection from Najibullah in 1991 contributed to the 
collapse of the communist regime. 
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2. Civil War and the Warlord Era 
 The period of Afghan civil war saw a struggle for power in the context of a 
completely ineffective central authority. In 1989, the Mujahideen insurgency finally 
compelled the Soviet military to withdraw.  With the end of Soviet funding in 1992, the 
communist regime fell and Afghanistan descended into a violent civil war among 
warlords.   During this time Dostum consolidated his human resources by recruiting 
militia members from among his ethnic tribe, former jihadi commanders and other former 
communist military commanders.  Initially allied with Tajik leader Massood in the 
struggle to control Kabul, Dostum's allegiances wavered back and forth during the 
struggle between the Jihadis and the Northern Alliance.
3. Taliban Regime 
 In 1994, the Taliban defeated the various warlord factions and seized control of 
most of Afghanistan.  Their tenure was marked by a strict Islamist regime.  With the 
support of their Pakistani patrons, the Taliban movement in a few years swept north from 
Kandahar to Kabul to Mazar-I Sharif, Dostum’s stronghold.  Abdul Malik, a subordinate 
commander who offered to deal with the Taliban, betrayed Dostum, causing Uzbekistan 
to lose faith in Dostum.125  The coercive nature of the Taliban regime forced Dostum to 
flee the country.  Uzbekistan would not give him sanctuary but did offer him safe transit 
and he settled in Turkey.  The period of Taliban rule ended in 2001 with the intervention 
of U.S. forces and ouster of the regime. 
4. American Defeat of the Taliban 
 After the Taliban were defeated, the current Afghan central government was 
assisted back to power by U.S. forces.  Dostum returned to Afghanistan in 2001 with 
Uzbek support as the Northern Alliance revolt against the Taliban gained momentum.  It 
is remarkable how quickly Dostum reestablished legitimacy and leadership.  The Uzbeks 
sent arms and ammunition for Dostum’s troops as well as Uzbek soldiers to fight 
alongside the warlord’s warriors.  With American Special Operations Forces support, 
125 Giustozzi, Respectable Warlords? The Politics of State building in Post-Taliban Afghanistan, 8. 
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Dostum reconsolidated his power base in the north while fighting westward towards 
Kabul.  Now a bit older and wiser, Dostum clearly had national level political aspirations.
But to understand these aspirations, we must look back over his earlier evolution as a 
political player. 
B. POLITICAL MOBILIZATION: MOVEMENT OF THE NORTH AND 
JUNBESH 
 After the Soviets withdrew, a weak central authority opened the opportunity for 
Dostum’s organization to extend its reach in the political arena.  The time was ripe for 
warlord activities.  With the fall of the Pushtun dominated communist regime, Dostum 
did not welcome the resumption of Pushtun dominance under the jihadi groups.  He 
stated early as 1990 that the Pushtun dominance of Uzbeks and Turks in the north would 
not be tolerated.126  In effect, he signaled his desire to overturn the status quo power and 
consolidate his political position as de facto leader of Uzbeks and Turks.  His actions in 
1992 to repel General Rasul at Balkh demonstrated his ability to back up his political 
position.  His band of military commanders, jihadi officers and warriors became known 
as the "Movement of the North." 
 However, the jihadi leaders in power did not recognize Dostum’s organization as 
a political party, so gave it no voice in Kabul.  Dostum demonstrated his political 
ambitions by establishing with his coalition partners in early 1992 the Junbesh-Milli-ye 
Islami party, an organization consolidating all the political forces in northern 
Afghanistan.  Its executive council comprised ten former communist members, five 
military officers, and fourteen mujahideen leaders.127  Because of the group's diversity, 
its members spent the early years focused on determining leadership and dominance 
within the organization.  Although he was the dominant military commander, Dostum 
had competition from the other members of the council for political dominance. 
126  Giustozzi, The Ethnicization of an Afghan Faction: Junbesh-I I-Milli from its Origins to the 
Presidential Elections, 1. 
127  Ibid. 
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C. STRUGGLE FOR POLITICAL LEGITIMACY 
 Many of the northern warlords gained power in the 1990’s.  Unlike many militia 
leaders who found their legitimacy in qawm ethnic structures, or the mujahideen who 
found their legitimacy in Islamic fundamentalist ideology, Dostum did not recruit or lead 
from an ethnic or religious position.  He was for the most part secular, drawing his 
strength from his military background and reputation.  However, since he severed ties 
with the communist regime and President Najibullah in 1991, he changed his focus from 
consolidating military legitimacy to political legitimization.128
 When the central authority collapsed, all coercive measures taken by the state to 
suppress political ethnic movements disappeared as well.  It is not clear if Dostum 
recognized this immediately.  He attempted to proclaim himself leader of the Uzbek and 
Turkomen ethnicities, where no such relation was conceived of previously.  His action 
was provoked by the competition for national power between Pushtun-led Mujahideen 
leaders such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Tajik leader Massood.  Dostum entered the 
struggle for the national-level prize by inserting his forces into Kabul, staking his right as 
a player.  His adversaries' more organized political entities gained international 
recognition and dismissed Dostum’s coalition as a non-political militia force that would 
be closed out of political discussions.  After this political maneuver, Dostum returned to 
his regional power base to establish Junbesh-I Milli-ye Islami, claiming it represented 
northern Afghanistan.129   
 Dostum was elected Junbesh’s leader in June 1, 1992.  The executive council 
clearly reflected the coalition effort in the north.  Military reputation and legitimacy 
seemed to be the main factors in leadership, rather than ethnicity or tribe.  Even at the 
time, Dostum seemed more comfortable with secular arrangements, seeking to base his 
participation in Junbesh on his military reliability.  This military mindset may have 
precluded serious political organization within Junbesh in the first two years.  Without 
establishing a political or ideological identity, it would be unable to compete for political 
128  Antonio Giustozzi has produced a well researched analysis of the warlord’s deliberate 
transformation from military leader to political fame and power.  Giustozzi, The Ethnicization of an Afghan 
Faction: Junbesh-I I-Milli from its Origins to the Presidential Elections, 2. 
129 Ibid., 2. 
51
power in Kabul.130  Lacking political legitimacy, Dostum and Junbesh were viewed only 
as a regional threat. 
 Within Junbesh, none of the ethnic minorities initially had more than fifty percent 
of the leadership positions.  To the extent there was an ethnic agenda, the Movement 
adopted the traditional anti-Pushtun regional stance.  However, the leadership’s focus 
was military legitimacy and it even recruited Pushtuns with military competence.131
Giustozzi says that Dostum did not “treat Pushtuns as enemies.”132  However, by 2002 
the Junbesh leadership was 56 percent Uzbek.133  Giustozzi concludes that in order to 
find a political identity and legitimacy, the group turned to ethnic consolidation of the 
leadership and mobilization of the Uzbek ethnic group. 
 Of course, this transformation took over a decade.  Military power struggles had 
to be sorted out.  Dostum proved the most reputable military man, and he controlled the 
most resources, so he eventually became the clear leader of the movement. The military 
leadership refined its political base by gradually removing the more leftist communist 
members, and the leftist intelligentsia began to detach from the party.   
D. TURKIC ETHNIC BASE 
 Dostum's use of an untapped resource—ethnicity—to advance his political goals, 
compared with his scant attention to the actual needs of the local ethnic populations, 
reflect a warlord mindset.  Seeking to fulfill his own personal goals of wealth, power, and 
fame, as the national environment changes has transformed Dostum as well.  
 With the fall of the Taliban, Dostum stepped up efforts to promote himself as 
leader of the Uzbek and Turkomen ethnic groups, making deals in Kabul to support 
various ethnic leaders in the ministries of the national level government.134  However, his 
political success was mixed due to politicization. Reports of his operations against 
Turkomen in the populace contrasted with his lighter treatment of the Uzbek people.
130 Giustozzi, The Ethnicization of an Afghan Faction: Junbesh-I I-Milli from its Origins to the 
Presidential Elections, 2-3. 
131 Ibid., 2-3, 8. 
132 Ibid., 9. 
133 Ibid., 5. 
134 Ibid., 15-17. 
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 The Uzbeks and Turkomen are part of the Turkic ethnic group from the Central 
Asian region and same language family.  They live in Afghanistan and the former Soviet 
republics; historically many entered Afghanistan after the Bolshevik revolution and 
subsequent suppression of the Basmachi revolt in Central Asia.  As a result, 
anticommunism was strong within both groups even before the 1978 communist coup 
and Soviet occupation.  They produce Afghanistan’s most valued traditional exports, 
karakuls pelts and fine carpets, and continue to identify themselves by their Central Asian 
places of origin.135
 A good sign of real political representation came after 2001 with the decision to 
have universal suffrage and open elections for state institutional positions.  Giustozzi 
reports on yet another transformation by the Junbesh (and, by implication, Dostum).  
Whereas Junbesh's politics originally meant recruiting military leaders into the party, the 
party subsequently moved to execute a full spectrum of political actions, including 
attending to electoral issues and political campaigning at the grassroots level. 136  The 
challenge Dostum now faces is accommodating the sudden politicization of northern 
ethnic groups, especially in the cities.  The transformation of ethnicities in the north is 
causing Dostum’s movement to lose coherence, though he sustains his military appeal. At 
this time, it is evident by Dostum’s reworking of the membership that he is slowly 
transforming the Junbesh party into a national party.137
 Dostum continues with the strategy of politicizing the Uzbek ethnic base.  He has 
been positively recognized in Uzbekistan and even Turkey, and has politically elevated 
the meaning of the traditional term "qawm" to include all Uzbeks in Afghanistan.  In 
effect, Giustozzi says, Dostum has branded himself as the most recognized Uzbek 
throughout Afghanistan.138
135 Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan : State Formation and Collapse in the International 
System, 30. 
136 Giustozzi, The Ethnicization of an Afghan Faction: Junbesh-I I-Milli from its Origins to the 
Presidential Elections, 2. The Junbesh party, having failed in its bid to get Afghanistan to adopt a federalist 
system that would empower the regional leaders, has turned towards consolidating ethnic groups by 
redrawing provincial boundaries.  Giustozzi cites an example of Ismaili Tajik, Mehr Roeen, once allied 
with Dostum and a leader within Junbesh.  He declined an offer to run with Dostum for national level 
positions due to Dostum’s ethnicization of the Uzbek leadership.   
137 Ibid., 2. Giustozzi notes that the leftist members continue to be marginalized, mujahideen are 
valued in the ranks, and secularism continues to attract the intelligentsia. 
138 Ibid., 2. 
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E. POLITICAL CAMPAIGNING   
Dostum began transforming himself to appeal to a political audience through new 
rhetoric as early as 2002.  Perhaps playing to a global audience, including the U.S., 
Dostum spoke to the people in northern Afghanistan about Abraham Lincoln, using the 
words "government by the people, for the people."  He has made similar speeches in an 
effort to reach audiences of Islamic clergy also.139  As part of his physical 
transformation, the warlord shaved his beard and traded his uniform for a civilian suit.140
Clearly, this warlord was seeking more than military legitimacy—he wants political 
power and fame.   
 Dostum continued to demonstrate his political acumen by staging a political 
campaign in the 2004 national election. Dostum’s lieutenants brought people from all 
over the northern region for a political rally at his stronghold in Sheberghan, where, in 
the traditional Afghan way, games were staged and lavish meals prepared.  Dostum and 
his men, also in the traditional way, patronized the people with gifts and money to 
generate political support for his presidential campaign.  As Afghan reporter Massood 
Fariviar observes, these same Dostum strongmen then provided a subtle if not persistent 
armed presence until Election Day, reminding the public of who provides local 
security.141
 The media attention Dostum generated got the notice of politicians worldwide.  
Anthony Davis reports one European diplomat's observation that, "Dostum has made the 
transition to politician far quicker than most Afghan leaders. He's hung up his fatigues for 
a business suit."  Nonetheless, Davis notes, Dostum did kept his 7,000 man army.142
F. DEMANDS AND COMPROMISE 
 The political turf battle between Dostum and Karzai continued into 2005.  
Dostum, together with one-time ally and fellow northern warlord Atta Mohammad, 
139 Giustozzi, The Ethnicization of an Afghan Faction: Junbesh-I I-Milli from its Origins to the 
Presidential Elections, 46. 
140 Davis, Makeover for a Warlord, 46. 
141 Farivar, Washington's Blind Spot in Afghanistan, 19. 
142 Davis, Makeover for a Warlord, 46. 
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demanded that more autonomy be granted to the northern regions from Kabul and that the 
mainly Tajik and Uzbek north be granted autonomy from the center.143
 The warlords are probably fighting the ongoing disarmament process, which aims 
to take heavy weaponry and small arms from the warlords militias.  Because warlords’ 
power derived originally from their military legitimacy, as their military legitimacy 
erodes, their power erodes as well.  In 2004, news focused on repeated accusations that 
Dostum had failed to comply with the disarmament process. 
Mr. Dostum's forces had surrendered a dozen tanks and 75 artillery pieces, 
believed to account for 40 percent of his heavy weaponry. One thousand 
men from each side have also undergone demobilization, leaving the two 
commanders with official forces of 4,400 fighters each. However, Mr. 
Dostum is believed to have 3,000 additional fighters at his disposal and 
Mr. Atta is believed to be able to call on 2,000 fighters in case of need.144
 If the reports are accurate, then Dostum’s military power has been greatly reduced 
since he commanded a division in the 1980’s, and certainly less diminished from his peak 
of power in 1992, when he could marshal 120,000 men.  There is a tradeoff of political 
legitimacy for military power, and a tension between the two.  It is doubtful that Dostum 
would totally relinquish his military force.  His rise to power, facilitated by ethnic 
mobilization, has always been based on his ability to coerce with armed force. 
G. PUBLIC RELATIONS 
When a warlord is in control of a region, legitimacy and justice are relative.  For 
example, the only thing that came out of charges that Dostum was responsible for the 
mass graves of hundreds of Taliban soldiers in 2001 was a major public relations fiasco.  
The prisoners had been held in shipping containers and many suffocated to death.145  The 
143 Malik, Warlords' Threat to Secede, 11. 
144 "Afghanistan Politics: Disarmament Faces Hurdles," EIU News Wire (Aug 25, 2004), 
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=701164011&Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD. 
(accessed January 30, 2007). 
145  Khabir Ahmad, "UN Envoy Urges as Inquiry into Human-Rights Abuses in Afghanistan," The 
Lancet 360, no. 9344 (November 9, 2002), 1486. http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=236832841& 
Fmt=7&clientId=65345&RQT=309&VName=PQD.  (accessed January 30, 2007). “In November [2001] 
US-backed forces of Uzbek warlord Abdul Rashid Dostum, now deputy defense minister, allegedly 
suffocated to death hundreds of Taliban prisoners in sealed cargo containers and then buried them in a mass 
grave in northern Afghanistan. Earlier [2002], Washington-based Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) 
revealed the existence of this grave. Jahangir said she was "disturbed" by these deaths.” 
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media felt the pressure of Dostum’s presence and were uncomfortable seeking the truth.  
According to Kirk Troy,
People in Mazar-e-Sharif are wary of the situation and many were afraid 
to talk about sensitive issues such as the mass grave at Dasht-i-Leili for 
fear of reprisals. Journalists are constantly under surveillance by local 
authorities and worry about their safety when dealing with issues like the 
alleged massacre. One local cameraman, who has now left the country, 
was badly beaten after selling documentary footage of the mass graves and 
interviewing witnesses. 146
 The United Nations also had a hard time investigating the incident, because the 
instability in the area made investigations “difficult.”  Many UN officials would not 
speak on the record about the situation.  In the absence of conclusive investigative results, 
Dostum strongly denied that there had been any sort of massacre.  He said that many 
bodies in the mass grave were prisoners who had died of battle wounds.  Dostum’s public 
appeal as a military leader has been buttressed by unanimous hatred of the Taliban.  
Warlord Atta Mohammed says, "Generally my idea is that those who were killed came 
here to kill. They were not here to build roads, schools and hospitals."147
 In conclusion,  Dostum has used his military legitimacy to help him in his quest 
for wealth, fame and political power.  His path is unusual because his military power base 
mitigated the tumultuous issues faced by other armed bands and political organizations 
whose power is based on ethnic identity.  However, when opportunities for political 
action emerged, Dostum adapted by politicizing his ethnic base.  Since the  communist 
overthrow, he has been motivated to seek political fame and power beyond his military 
base.  His part in establishing Junbesh shows his ability to attract ethnic, religious and 
military allies.  His many seemingly contradictory alliances indicate that he has a long 
term vision of self-fulfillment and manages his patron-client relationships to support his 
personal goals; he has created a political space in which to pursue typical warlord goals 
of power, fame and wealth.  Davis remarks on Dostum's not-so-benevolent brand of 
politics.
146  Kirk Troy, "Life and Death with Warlords," Far Eastern Economic Review 165, no. 49 
(December 12, 2002), 24, http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=261569531&Fmt=7&clientId= 
65345&RQT= 309&VName=PQD. (accessed January 30, 2007). 
147  Ibid., 24. 
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Just how democratic politics will fare under a man whose portrait hangs in 
every office, shop and school across his fief remains to be seen. "Dostum 
fits straight into the pattern of Central Asian authoritarianism that's 
digging in across the region," says a Western official in Kabul. "Anyone 
who imagines this is some roly-poly Mr. Nice Guy who understands 
democratic give-and take is making a mistake." 148
148 Davis, Makeover for a Warlord, 46. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
A. THESIS SUMMARY 
 Warlords are defined by their military legitimacy and their desire for political 
power, fame, and wealth.  Rashid Dostum's rise to his current position as one of the most 
powerful military leaders in Afghanistan resulted from his desire for power and fame and 
presents a challenge to the Afghan state as it struggles for peace and stability. 
 Patronage as a form of state governance inherently weakens states.  Patronage 
politics in Afghanistan has shallow roots, revealed by weak state policies.  As long as 
patronage (supported by monetary disbursement) flows to local leaders, nominal 
allegiance is paid to the central government and governance is left to traditional 
organizations and local strongmen.  Patronage ties are much stronger at local levels; there 
strongmen become warlords and seek to widen their political powers, undermining the 
central government.  Foreign patronage of warlords also compromises the state's ability 
to govern locally.
 Warlord economics revolves around a variety of potential revenues for financing 
warlord groups.   There are four types of resources: natural resources, taxes, illicit 
activities, and foreign aid.  Under the communist regime, Dostum ran a militia funded by 
the government, and resources for operations came from a stable and simple 
environment.  When the Afghan central authority disintegrated and the state plunged into 
civil war, the opportunities for revenue abounded, but the number of adversaries 
increased.  The new economic environment is unstable and complex. 
 A warlord organization is a good fit for the environment.  In simple environments, 
the warlord exercises direct control over his subordinates.  In highly complex 
environments, the patron network may extend horizontally to other warlords, state 
institutions, international actors, illegal-clandestine actors and other partners. 
 Dostum’s early organization, the 53rd Division, was a purely military 
organization, with dedicated revenues from the state and foreign donors.  Even in the 
1980’s and early 1990’s, Dostum funneled capital from the state both legally and 
illegally, as the customs fees he collected at Hairatan should have been forwarded to 
Kabul.  This was a complex situation.  But due to the weakness of the state, there was 
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never really a risk that the state would stop his illegal activities.  When the Najibullah 
regime fell, Dostum commanded a division-sized element, probably the largest 
organization operating at the tactical level.  He established standing operating procedures 
through fear and ruthless leadership to ensure consistent behavior from his subordinates.   
 In terms of popular support, because traditional society does not extend beyond 
the local level, national ethnic organizations are prone to instability and so are the 
organizations that mobilize populations using ethnic ideology.  A warlord like Dostum, 
with a stable power base, will have better success surviving in the long run given 
Afghanistan’s turbulent political environment. 
B. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 The way ahead will be a continued contest of wills and compromises between 
warlords such as Dostum and the central Afghan authority.  The warlord’s narrow view 
of the world, a world dominated by individual strongmen who demand and dole out 
patronage, prevents them from placing faith in a bureaucracy like a national level 
government.  The Afghan parliament indicated acceptance of the gradual reincorporation 
of warlords.  In 2005, the lower house of the Afghanistan parliament passed a bill 
granting amnesty for all Afghan crimes over the last 25 years.149  This would exonerate 
all warlords, to include Dostum, of all the criminal activities that have been attributed to 
them 
 By definition, warlords have military legitimacy in the areas in which they 
operate.  Dostum is clearly maintaining his military force despite having publicly 
announced support for the government’s disarmament program.150  His militia still serves 
Dostum and executes his version of law and order based on warlord power struggles.  In 
a recent event, former Dostum ally Faizulla Zaki, a current member of parliament from 
Jauzjani province, was roughed up and sent to Uzbekistan for hospitalization.151  This 
incident is reminiscent of when Dostum’s forces chased the governor of Faryab province 
149 Gall, Carlotta, “Afghans Urge Legal Amnesty for Those Involved in Wars,” New York Times,
February 12, 2007, A12. 
150 Morajee, Rachel, “Afghan warlord backs plan to disarm militias,” Financial Times, February 26, 
2006, 2. 
151 Gall, Carlotta, “Ethnic Uzbek Legislator Beaten, Afghans Confirm,” New York Times, June 30, 
2006, A7. 
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out of that northern province.  If Dostum was indeed behind this thuggish act, it would 
indicate that the member of parliament duty-bound to work for his constituents despite 
warlord influence.  If warlord patronage is losing influence to the central authority is a 
good thing for the state.  This incident suggests violent presence that warlords like 
Dostum still continue to have, especially in their stronghold areas.  The process of 
transferring power from warlords to the national government will not happen in a single 
event or ceremony; it will be regime political compromise and the path may not be often 
symbolic incidents of violence.  However, it is doubtful Dostum, having a stake in the 
central authority, will use his militias to plunge the country back into a civil war such as 
in the 1990’s. 
 This thesis also characterizes warlords by their desire for power, fame, and 
wealth.  Dostum at this time is clearly the symbolic leader of the ethnic Uzbeks and 
Turkomen in Afghanistan.  He holds the highest military position in the Afghani Armed 
Forces as the Army Chief of Staff.  He will likely use his influence for progress in the 
northern provinces.  However, as a national figure, he has shown signs of extending his 
party’s membership to regions outside of the north.  Since the influence of his militia 
does not extend to regions outside his northern stronghold, to gain a political following, 
he will have to begin incorporating more non-violent political methods.   
 Dostum can be a positive force by providing an alternative to the Pushtun and 
Jihadi political elements in the rest of the country.  It will be interesting to see which 
group is better capable of subduing or integrating tribal society into national level 
politics.  Dostum has shown that a disciplined, secular militia can form a strong base to 
mobilize ethnic populations.  However, since it is not clear that tribal law can work at the 
national level, what group can better subdue the unstable and violent tribal society?   
Afghan expert Thomas Johnson puts Afghanistan’s current challenges in perspective: 
The actual influence and control of the new, democratically elected 
government of Hamid Karzai extends only weakly beyond the outskirts of 
Kabul; ethno-linguistic fragmentation is on the rise.... large areas of 
Afghanistan are still ruled by warlords/ drug-lords.152
152 Johnson, Thomas H. “Afghanistan’s post-Taliban transition: the state of state-building after war,” 
Central Asian Survey, Vol. 25 (March-June 2006), 1. 
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 Increased government legitimacy can be indicated by diminishing warlord militia 
activity in relation to increased warlord political activity.  Warlords will be brought into 
the national regime when the government gains control of the sovereign right to the use 
of force within the state boundaries.  This includes the government’s ability to regulate 
and tax the sources of warlord revenue.  Taxation and representation are the means and 
building blocks for a functioning democratic state.  Implementing these means is integral 
to replacing the weak option of patronage style governance.  These means allow the state 
to build institutional bodies that can effectively govern the populace.  Until the central 
authority seizes their role of governing in the countryside, warlords like Dostum will hold 
tight to their place in Afghan society.   
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APPENDIX A. PROVINCIAL MAP OF AFGHANISTAN 
This map provides a clean picture of the provinces and major cities of Afghanistan. 153
153  Global Security, "Afghanistan Maps," Global Security, http://www.globalsecurity.org/ 
military/world/ afghanistan/ maps.htm, (accessed February 13, 2007). 
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APPENDIX B:  RELIEF MAP OF AFGHANISTAN 
This map provides a general picture of the elevation relief of Afghanistan. 154
154  Global Security, "Afghanistan Maps," Global Security, http://www.globalsecurity.org/ 
military/world/ afghanistan/ maps.htm, (accessed February 13, 2007). 
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APPENDIX C: ETHNOLINGUISTIC MAP OF AFGHANISTAN 
This map provides a basic picture of the ethno-linguistic groupings in Afghanistan. 155
155  Global Security, "Afghanistan Maps," Global Security, http://www.globalsecurity.org/ 
military/world/ afghanistan/ maps.htm,  (accessed February 13, 2007). 
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APPENDIX D: REGIONAL MAP 
This map provides a general size perspective of Afghanistan in relation to the U.S. 156
156  Global Security, "Afghanistan Maps," Global Security, http://www.globalsecurity.org/ 
military/world/ afghanistan/ maps.htm,  (accessed February 13, 2007). 
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APPENDIX E: DRUG PRODUCTION MAP OF AFGHANISTAN 
This map provides a general disposition of the regions of the area of poppy cultivation 
grow during 2000 in Afghanistan. 157
157  Global Security, "Afghanistan Maps," Global Security, http://www.globalsecurity.org/ 
military/world/ afghanistan/ maps.htm,  (accessed February 13, 2007). 
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